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THE 1951 SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY WITH
JAPAN AND THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTES IN EAST
ASIA
Seokwoo Leet
Abstract: There are currently three territorial disputes over islands in East Asia in
which Japan is a disputant: against Russia, over the Kurile Islands; against China and
Taiwan, over the Senkaku Islands; and against Korea, over the Liancourt Rocks.
Although all the claimants marshal support for their cases from historical sources, it
cannot be denied that much of the uncertainty surrounding the territorial demarcation is a
by-product of immediate post-World War II boundary decisions and territorial
dispositions. The final disposition of territories tr East Asia at the end of World War II
was effected by the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951. The San Francisco Peace
Treaty failed to define the "Kurile Islands," and further to specify the entity in whose
favor Japan had renounced sovereignty over the disputed islands. Additionally, specific
mention of the Senkaku Islands and the Liancourt Rocks did not appear in the territorial
clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Accordingly, there is a need for a careful
examination of how a series of drafts of the Treaty defined the terms of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty regarding these disputed islands in East Asia. The territorial clause of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty regarding the Kurile Islands can be interpreted as follows:
first, the Soviet Union is the only recipient of the Kurile Islands envisaged by the Allied
Powers; second, there were no agreed definitions of the "Kurile Islands" among the
Allied Powers; and third, there are strong indications that the Allied Powers preferred not
to resolve the matter of the ultimate disposition of the Kurile Islands in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. The Senkaku Islands were not included as either Chinese and Taiwanese
or Japanese territory by the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, and Article 3 of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not, to the point of specificity, define the territories
that were placed within the area of the United Nations trusteeship with the United States
as the sole administering authority. The territorial clause on the Liancourt Rocks could
indicate that the San Francisco Peace Treaty assigns the Liancourt Rocks to Japan.
However, due to the contradictory nature of the various drafts of the treaty, Korea may
still be free to establish that the "Korea" renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
included the Liancourt Rocks.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1895, Japan signaled its intention to join the world's great colonial
powers by embarking on an aggressive campaign of territorial expansion in
East Asia.' This campaign, though successful on its own terms, spread death
and misery to millions of people living in the acquired territories. Finally, in
1945, Japan's empire imploded.
This Article argues that while the post-war period offered the
opportunity for the complete and unambiguous resolution of territorial
questions regarding Japan, the lack of precision 'in key diplomatic
documents, especially the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951, allowed
certain territorial disputes to arise between Japan and its neighbors. For
example, Japan and Russia both claim sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, a
small group of islands, currently occupied by Russia, lying to the north of
Hokkaido, the northernmost of Japan's four main islands. Additionally,
Japan, China, and Taiwan all claim sovereignty over eight uninhabited
islands in the East China Sea known as the Senkaku Islands. Finally, Japan
and Korea both claim sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks, a pair of rocky
islets in the Sea of Japan/East Sea. The Liancourt Rocks are currently
occupied by Korea.
In this article, "East Asia" encompasses the East China Sea and the Sea of Japan/East Sea,
surrounded by China, Taiwan, Japan, North Korea, South Korea [hereinafter Korea], and Russia. This
article uses internationally known names of the islands in dispute or the names used by the current occupant
country.
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Section II examines the historical background of each dispute
including the bases for the claims made by the various parties. In the case of
the dispute between Russia and Japan over the Kurile Islands, treaties
executed between the two countries in 1855 and 1875 are the starting point
of the discussion. Questions remain as to whether the San Francisco Peace
Treaty had the effect of reinstating the terms of pre-war treaties, and if so,
whether the treaties themselves were precise enough to put the conflict to
rest.
The claimants disagree over who first discovered and effectively
occupied the Senkaku Islands and whether they were terra nullius when
Japan incorporated the islands in January 1895. In the same context, it is
also questionable whether China ceded the Senkaku Islands along with
Taiwan to Japan under the Shimonoseki Treaty after being defeated in the
Sino-Japanese War in May 1895. The question also remains as to whether
the islands reverted to China after Japan's defeat in 1945, were incorporated
into Taiwan in 1949, or were restored to Japan as part of Okinawa in 1972.
As to the Liancourt Rocks, Japan specifically affirmed its claim to the
Liancourt Rocks by officially incorporating them into Shimane Prefecture in
1905. Japan opines that the Liancourt Rocks were terra nullius in 1905, and
therefore subject to occupation, while Korea asserts that historical
documentation proves that the Liancourt Rocks belonged to Korea prior to
Japan's alleged 1905 incorporation, thereby refuting Japan's contentions that
the Liancourt Rocks were terra nullius. Korea regained its independence in
the aftermath of the Second World War, and Japan specifically renounced its
claims to several named islands in the Sea of Japan/East Sea when it signed
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the treaty was silent regarding
the status of the Liancourt Rocks. Thus, for almost fifty years the two sides
have exchanged unilateral declarations of sovereignty over the tiny islands.
Section III analyzes the diplomatic and political maneuvering that
allowed these territorial questions to remain unanswered. Included in this
section is a discussion of the declarations of intent issued by the Allied
Powers late in the war when it was apparent that Japan would be defeated,
i.e., the Cairo Declaration, the Yalta Agreement, and the Potsdam
Proclamation. These resolutions provided the general framework for the San
Francisco Peace Treaty. The evolution of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
itself, as revealed in a series of interim drafts, is also examined. The
ongoing territorial disputes in East Asia, as this research demonstrates,
involve intertwined political and legal issues. In other words, these three
territorial disputes have multifaceted implications for the disputants on the
one hand, and for the relations between the disputants and the interested
VOL. I11 No. I
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powers, notably the United States, on the other hand. The rivalry between
the United States and the former Soviet Union in the period of the Cold War;
the complicated stance of the United States in the cross-strait relations
between China and Taiwan; and the hands-off policy of the United States in
the territorial disputes between Korea and Japan are only partial examples of
U.S. involvement in the territorial disputes in East Asia. This situation is
complicated by the fact that regional stability in East Asia has been largely
influenced by U.S. security interests.
Section IV offers observations regarding the future course that the
disputes might take.
II. JAPAN'S TERRITORIAL DISPUTES
There will be no complicated frontiers to define in the Japanese
Peace Treaty since Japanese territories are all insular. . . . It
will be for the Peace Conference to decide which of the minor
islands shall remain under Japanese sovereignty and when this
decision has been reached the main territorial article could be
something quite simple.... In determining which of the minor
islands shall remain under Japanese sovereignty the decisive
considerations must be strategic .... A large number of islands
in waters immediately adjacent to Japan which should clearly
remain under Japanese sovereignty. A number of islands
between Hokkaido and Sakhalin, between Hokkaido and the
Kuriles, and between Japan proper and Korea in regard to the
disposal of which some difference of opinion may be
expected. . . . Very careful drafting of this section will be
necessary in order to ensure that no islands are left in disputed
sovereignty (emphasis added).2
Japan is a party to three ongoing territorial disputes that, arguably,
could have been prevented by more diligent diplomacy fifty years ago:3
2 Memorandum of Conversation, Canberra Conference on Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't
Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/10-647, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 6, 1947)
(on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
3 For general information on these disputes, see BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES 438-39, 497-
519 (John B. Allcock et al. eds., 3d ed. 1992); Jonathan I. Charney, Probable Future Outcomes of Some
Island Disputes around Japan, in MARITIME BOUNDARY ISSUES AND ISLANDS DISPUTES IN THE EAST ASIAN
REGION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1s ' ANNUAL CONFERENCE 158 (Young-Koo Kim ed., 1998); David A.
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against Russia, Japan continues to claim sovereignty over the Southern
Kurile Islands/Northem Territories ("Kurile Islands"); 4 against the People's
Republic of China ("China") and the Republic of China ("Taiwan") over the
Pinnacle Islands/Senkaku Islands/Diao-yu-tai (or Tiao-yu-tai) ("Senkaku
Islands"); 5 and against Korea over the Liancourt Rocks/Tokdo/Takeshima
("Liancourt Rocks").6
Colson, Island Disputes in East Asia, in SECURITY FLASHPOINTS: OIL, ISLANDS, SEA ACCESS AND
MILITARY CONFRONTATION (Myron Nordquist & John Norton Moore, eds. 1998); Daniel J. Dzurek, Island
Disputes in East Asia, in SECURITY FLASHPOINTS: OIL, ISLANDS, SEA ACCESS AND MILITARY
CONFRONTATION (Myron Nordquist & John Norton Moore eds. 1998); DOUGLAS M. JOHNSTON & MARK J.
VALENCIA, PACIFIC OCEAN BOUNDARY PROBLEMS: STATUS AND SOLUTIONS 104-21 (1991); ATLAS FOR
MARINE POLICY IN EAST ASIAN SEAS 25-34 (Joseph R. Morgan & Mark J. Valencia eds., 1992); THE
PRACTICE OF JAPAN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1961-1970 44-108 (Shigeru Oda & Hisashi Owada eds.,
1982); Choon-Ho Park, Central Pacific and East Asian Maritime Boundaries 297-302, in INTERNATIONAL
MARITIME BOUNDARIES (Jonathan I. Charney & Lewis M. Alexander eds., 1993); CHOON-HO PARK, EAST
ASIA AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 1-125, 209-88 (1983); J.R. VICTOR PRESCOTT, MARITIME JURISDICTION IN
EAST ASIAN SEAS (Occasional Paper No. 4; The East West Environment and Policy Institute, East-West
Center, 1987); SURYA P. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 279-
82, 291-301 (1997); ROBERT W. SMITH & BRADFORD L. THOMAS, ISLAND DISPUTES AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA: AN EXAMINATION OF SOVEREIGNTY AND DELIMITATION DISPUTES 2-6 (MARITIME BRIEFING, Vol. 2,
No. 4: International Boundaries Research Unit, U. Durham, 1998).
4 This is a small group of islands, just north of Hokkaido, known by the Russians as the Southern
Kurile (or Kuril) Islands, and known to the Japanese as the Northern Territories. Except when quoting or
directly referring to sources that use the term "Kuril," this article uses the term "Kurile." For further
information on this dispute, see "NORTHERN TERRITORIES" AND BEYOND: RUSSIAN, JAPANESE, AND
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES (James E. Goodby et al. eds., 1995); NORTHERN TERRITORIES ISSUE
ASSOCIATION, JAPAN'S NORTHERN TERRITORIES (1974); Glen W. Price, Comment: Legal Analysis of the
Kurile Island Dispute, 7 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L. J. 395 (1993); DAVID REES, THE SOVIET SEIZURE OF THE
KURILES (1985); Joseph L. Sutton, Territorial Claims of Russia and Japan in the Kurile Islands, in I
OCCASIONAL PAPERS, CENTER FOR JAPANESE STUDIES 35 (1951); Yuichi Takano, The Territorial Problems
between Japan and the Soviet Union, 3 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L. 52-64 (1959); Kosaku Tamura, Origins
of the Northern Territorial Issue and Its Legal Status, 2 JAPAN ANNUAL INT'L AFFAIRS 73-96 (1962).
s Japan calls these islands "Sento Shosho" or "Senkaku Retto," which means "Pinnacle Islands" as
internationally recognized. China calls them "Diao-yu-tai," and Taiwan terms them "Tiao-yu-tai," using
the same Chinese characters with a different romanization system.
For further information on the dispute with China and Taiwan, see K.T. Chao, East China Sea:
Boundary Problems Relating to the Tiao-Yu-T'ai Islands, in 3 CHINESE Y'B OF INT'L L. & AFFAIRS 45
(1983); Tao Cheng, The Sino-Japanese Dispute over the Tiao-yu-tai (Senkaku) Islands and the Law of
Territorial Acquisition, 14 VIRG. J. INT'L L. 221 (1973-74); Hungdah Chiu, An Analysis of the Sino-
Japanese Dispute over the T'iaoyoutai Islets (Senkaku Gunto), 15 CHINESE Y'B. INT'L L. & AFFAIRS 9-31
(1996-97); Daniel J. Dzurek, Effect of the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands Dispute on Maritime Delimitation 409,
in BORDERLANDS UNDER STRESS (Martin A. Pratt et al. eds., 2000); JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CHINA AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA, AIR, AND ENVIRONMENT 126-43 (1979); JEANETTE GREENFIELD, CHINA'S PRACTICE
IN THE LAW OF THE SEA 127-29 (1992); SELIG S. HARRISON, CHINA, OIL, AND ASIA: CONFLICT AHEAD?
146-88, 213-30 (1977); Wei-Chin Lee, Troubles Under the Water: Sino-Japanese Conflict of Sovereignty
on the Continental Shelf in the East China Sea, 18 OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 585 (1987); Victor H. Li, China
and Off-Shore Oil: The Tiao-yii Tai Dispute, 10 STAN. J. INT'L STUDIES 143, 151 (1975); YING-JEOU MA,
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF SEABED BOUNDARY DELIMITATION IN THE EAST CHINA SEA 69, in 3(62)
OCCASIONAL PAPERS/REPRINTS SERIES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIAN STUDIES (Hungdah Chiu et al. eds.,
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Among the three disputed areas, the Kurile Islands have been
considered the most important area to the Japanese.7 Unlike the other two
areas in dispute, the Kurile Islands dispute has significantly different
features due to the large human population there.8 The territorial dispute
over the Senkaku Islands occupied by Japan involves a number of factors,
including future offshore oil development. If considered to be "islands" as
defined by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
("Law of the Sea Convention"), 9 sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands could
1984); Toshio Okuhara, The Territorial Sovereignty over the Senkaku Islands and Problems on the
Surrounding Continental Shelf, 15 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L. 97 (1971); Choon-Ho Park, Oil under
Troubled Waters: The Northeast Asia Sea-Bed Controversy, 14 HARV. INT'L L. J. 212 (1973); Thomas R.
Ragland, A Harbinger: The Senkaku Islands, 10 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 664 (1973); UNRYU SUGANUMA,
SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND TERRITORIAL SPACE IN SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS (2000). See also
INTERNATIONAL LAW CONFERENCE ON THE DISPUTE OVER DIAOYU/SENKAKU ISLANDS 1-162 (Taiwan Law
Soc. & Taiwan Institute Int'l Law eds., 1997).
For the official Japanese Government view on the Senkaku Islands dispute, refer to MINISTRY OF
FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, THE BASIC VIEW ON THE SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE SENKAKU ISLANDS (1972),
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/senkaku/senkaku.html (last visited Oct. 31, 2001). For
other Internet resources, see Phil Deans, The Diaoyutai/Senkaku Dispute: The Unwanted Controversy, at
http://ukc.ac.uk/politics/publications/ournals/kentpapers/deans.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2001); Daniel
Dzurek, The Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Dispute (1996), at http://www-ibru.dur.ac.uk/docs/senkaku.html (last
visited Nov. 10, 2000); Kiyoshi Inoue, Japanese Militarism and the Diaoyu (Senkaku) Islands: A Japanese
Historian's View, at http://www/io.org/-yuan/diaohist/html (last visited Jun. 18, 1999).
6 Liancourt Rocks are two tiny rocky islets are called "Tokdo" in Korean and "Takeshima" in
Japanese. For further information on this dispute, see Choung II Chee, Legal Status of Dok Island in
International Law, 42 KOREAN J. INT'L L. 1 (1997); Han Key Lee, Korea's Territorial Rights to Tokdo in
History and International Law, 29 KOREA OBSERVER 1 (1998); Kanae Taijudo, The Dispute between Japan
and Korea Respecting Sovereignty over Takeshima, 12 JAPANESE ANN. INT'L L. 1 (1968).
7 Memorandum of Conversation between Mr. Yoshimitsu Ando, Chief, General Affairs Section,
Political Bureau, Japanese Foreign Office, and Mrs. Meridith Weatherby, Foreign Service Officer, Office
of the United States Political Advisor for Japan, Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Records, Record Group
59 (Sept. 26, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD). See also Office of U.S. Political Advisor for Japan, Tokyo, Comment on Draft Treaty of Peace with
Japan, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/11-1949, State Dep't Records, Record Group
59 (Nov. 19, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD) [hereinafter Comment on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan] ("[The Kurile Islands] are of far greater
navigational and fishing importance to Japan than to any other possessor").
8 For further discussion of this issue, see Seokwoo Lee & Dakas C.J. Dakas, The Right to Self-
Determination in the Context of Territorial Disputes: The Kurile Islands in Perspective, 5 NOTTINGHAM
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 18-27 (2000).
9 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, art. 121(1)
21 I.L.M. 1261, 1291 [hereinafter Law of the Sea Convention]. Article 121(1) of the Law of the Sea
Convention defines an island as "a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above
water at high tide." Id. Under the new regime of the Convention, a state exercising territorial sovereignty
over an island may declare a territorial sea extending twelve nautical miles and an exclusive economic zone
("EEZ") that extends 200 nautical miles from the island's baseline. Id. arts. 2, 3, 56, 57. Within the EEZ,
the controlling state has sovereign rights over the natural resources located in the water, sea-bed, and
subsoil. Id. art. 56(l)(a). Rocks unable to sustain human habitation or economic life, however, are not
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affect 20,750 square nautical miles of marine space, and the vast mineral
resources in that area. l0 The Taiwan Straits dispute, which affects the
bilateral relations between China and Taiwan, is also one of the key issues
deserving attention. Unlike the disputes over the other islands, the Liancourt
Rocks dilemma suffers from a paucity of scholarly research, particularly in
the western world. Recently, the territorial dispute over the Liancourt Rocks
re-surfaced largely as a consequence of new exclusive economic zone claims
by the disputants, together with their respective ratifications of the Law of
the Sea Convention. If considered to be "islands" under the Law of the Sea
Convention, the Liancourt Rocks would include 16,600 square nautical
miles of marine space." Thus, national pride (as much as contestation over
territory, resources, and the associated maritime area) is a typical feature of
the islands in dispute.
Since the Treaty of Peace with Japan ("San Francisco Peace Treaty")
effected the final disposition of territories in East Asia following the
conclusion of World War II, its text should be the starting point for research
into the territorial disputes over islands in East Asia. 12 For that purpose,
although there could be other versions, this Article examines the following
treaty drafts: March 19, 1947; 13 August 5, 1947; 14 January 8, 1948; 15
entitled to an EEZ. Id. art. 121(3). The Convention does not explicitly define "human habitation or
economic life." Therefore, the relationship between certain rocks and "human habitation or economic life"
independent of outside assistance is a pivotal matter since it was left unanswered by the Convention. For
discussion on the meaning of "human habitation or economic life," see Jonathan I. Charney, Central East
Asian Maritime Boundaries and the Law of the Sea, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 734 (1995); Jonathan I. Chamey,
Rocks that Cannot Sustain Human Habitation, 93 Amt. J. INT'L L. 863 (1999).
" JANE'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES 1999-2000, 35 (Martin A. Pratt et al. eds., 1999). A nautical
mile is a unit of length used in sea navigation, and equals 1,852 meters, or about 6,076 feet. See BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 785 (abr. 6th ed. 1991).
" JOHNSTON & VALENCIA, supra note 3, at 113.
12 Treaty of Peace with Japan, Sept. 8, 1951, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45 [hereinafter San
Francisco Peace Treaty], available at http://newtaiwan.virtualave.net/sanfrancisco01.htm (last visited Nov.
4, 2001). For the legal background of the Treaty, see D.P. O'Connell, Legal Aspects of the Peace Treaty
with Japan, 29 BRITISH Y. B. INT'L L. 423-35 (1952). For a list of participants, agenda, rules of procedure,
verbatim minutes, and treaty documents, see U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, CONFERENCE FOR THE CONCLUSION
AND SIGNATURE OF THE TREATY OF PEACE WITH JAPAN: RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS (1951). For the
territorial dimension of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, see Zengo Ohira, The Territorial Problems of the
Peace Treaty with Japan, 7 THE ANNALS OF THE HITOTSUBASHI ACADEMY 115 (1957). For general
information on the San Francisco Peace Treaty, see FREDERICK S. DUNN, PEACE-MAKING AND THE
SETTLEMENT WITH JAPAN (1963); THE PALO ALTO PEACE CLUB, REPORT ON THE JAPANESE PEACE TREATY
(Aug., 1951); STAFF OF FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 82D CONG., JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND OTHER
TREATIES RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC (Comm. Print 1951); MICHAEL M. YOSHITSU, JAPAN
AND THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE SETTLEMENT (1983).
13 Dean G. Acheson, U.S. Secretary of State, Memorandum to General MacArthur, Outline and
Various Sections of Draft Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/3-2047, State
VOL. I I No. I
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October 13, 1949; 16 November 2, 1949; 17 December 8, 1949;18 December
19, 1949;1 9 December 29, 1949; 20 January 3, 1950;21 August 7, 1950;22
September 11, 1950;23 March 12, 1951;24 March 17, 195 1;25 April 7, 1951;26
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Mar. 3, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Memorandum to General MacArthur, Outline and
Various Sections of Draft Treaty].
" Memorandum from Hugh Borton, Acting Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Far Eastern
Affairs, to Charles E. Bohlen, Counselor of the Department of State: Draft Treaty of Peace for Japan, State
Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/8-647 CS/W, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug.
6, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD)
[hereinafter Memorandum from Hugh Borton].
15 Memorandum, Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File No.
740.0011 PW (PEACE)/l-3048 CS/W, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Jan. 30, 1948) (on file with
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
16 Memorandum, Attached Treaty Draft, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/10-
1449, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 14, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Memorandum, Attached Treaty Draft].
17 Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 2,
1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
"8 Memorandum from Samuel W. Boggs, Special Advisor on Geography, Office of Intelligence
Research, to Maxwell M. Hamilton, U.S. Representative on the Far Eastern Commission, and Robert A.
Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Dec. 8, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses].
19 Agreement respecting the Disposition of Former Japanese Territories, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Dec. 19, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD).
0 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan on December 29, 1949, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59
(Dec. 19, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD).
21 Memorandum from Samuel W. Boggs, Special Advisor on Geography, Office of Intelligence
Research, to Maxwell M. Hamilton, U.S. Representative on the Far Eastern Commission, and Robert A.
Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Jan. 3, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan].
22 Memorandum from John F. Dulles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Japanese Treaty,
State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/8-950 CS/H, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 9, 1950)
(on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter
Japanese Treaty].
23 Memorandum from John F. Dulles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, to Dean G.
Acheson, Secretary of State, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/9-1150 CS/MD, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Sep. 11, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD) [hereinafter Memorandum to Dean G. Acheson].
Memorandum from John F. Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, State Dep't Decimal File
No. 694.001/3-1251, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Mar. 12, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Memorandum from John F.
Dulles). Memorandum, State Dep't Decimal File No. FW 694.001/3-1751, State Dep't Records, Record
Group 59 (Mar. 17, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD).
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May 3, 1951;27 June 14, 1951;28 July 3, 1951;29 July 20, 195l1; 3 and August
13, 1951.
31
A. The Kurile Islands
The ongoing conflict between Russia and Japan centers around three
main islands: Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan, as well as around the
Habomai group.32 These islands are located in the southern end of the
Kurile Archipelago, a chain of islands linking the northernmost of Japan's
main islands, Hokkaido, with the Kamchatka peninsula in mainland
Russia.
21 Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), State Dep't Records, Record
Group 59 (Apr. 7, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD) [hereinafter Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom)].
27 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, Revised May 3, 1951, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/5-351,
State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (May 3, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
28 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/6-1451, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Jun. 14, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD).
9 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Jul. 3, 1951) (on file with
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
30 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, State Dep't Decimal File No. FW 694.001/7-2151, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Jul. 20, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
31 Japanese Peace Conference, San Francisco, California, Treaty of Peace with Japan, September,
1951, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 13, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
32 In Russia, Etorofu is known as Iturup, Kunashiri as Kunashir, and Shikotan together with the
Habomai group [hereinafter Habomais] as Little (or Lesser) Kuriles. This article uses Japanese names.
Etorofu's area is 3,139 square kilometers; Kunashiri's is 1,500 square kilometers; Shikotan's is 255 square
kilometers; and the Habomais' is 102 square kilometers. The total area is just short of 5,000 square
kilometers. The Habomai group of islets comprises Shibotsu (Zelyonyi), Taraku (Polonskogo), Yuri
(Yurii), Akiyuri (Anuchina), Suisho (Tanfileva), and Kaigara (Signal'nyi). Suisho, in the Habomais, is
about three miles from the tip of Cape Nosappu in Hokkaido, while Kunashiri is clearly visible from the
Shiretoko Peninsula in Hokkaido. See PETER BERTON, JAPANESE-RUSSIAN TERRITORIAL DILEMMA:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND, DISPUTES, ISSUES, QUESTIONS, SOLUTION SCENARIOS OR A THOUSAND
SCENARIOS FOR THE THOUSAND ISLANDS DISPUTE 8, 11 (Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1992); Joseph S. Roucek, Some Geographic Factors in the Strategy of the
Kuriles, 51 J. GEOGRAPHY 297 (1952).
33 Generally refer to the maps in MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, JAPAN'S NORTHERN
TERRITORIES 8-9 (1996), available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/regioneurope/russia/territory/index.html (last
visited Oct. 31, 2001).
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1. Pre-1945 Boundaries
Prior to World War II, the Kurile Islands had been the subject of
several treaties between Russia and Japan.
a. The Treaty of Shimoda and its1875 amendment
The Treaty of Commerce, Navigation and Delimitation between Japan
and Russia established the first Russo-Japanese boundary line in the Kurile
Archipelago.34 The Treaty of Shimoda states:
Henceforth the frontier between Japan and Russia will run
between the islands of [Etorofu and Uruppu]. The entire island
of [Etorofu] belongs to Japan and the entire island of [Uruppu],
as well as the other Kuril Islands to the north of that island,
belong to Russia. As for the island of [Sakhalin], it remains as
heretofore undivided between Japan and Russia.35
Even after the conclusion of the Treaty of Shimoda, the boundary line
was a source of friction between the two countries. Consequently, Japan
sent Buyo Enomoto, an ambassador plenipotentiary, to Russia to conduct a
series of negotiations with Sutumov, chief of the Asia Bureau there.36 As a
result, the Treaty of Shimoda was amended by the Treaty for the Exchange
34 Jan. 26, 1855, Japan-Russ., 112 Consol. T.S. 467 [hereinafter Treaty of Shimoda).
35 Id. art. II. Also available in STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT, INVENTORY
AND EXTRACTS OF KEY DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO THE GENESIS OF THE TERRITORIAL DISPUTE (1855-
1991) 4 (Belfer Ctr. for Science and Int'l Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1991), and in GRAHAM ALLISON et al.,
BEYOND COLD WAR TO TRILATERAL COOPERATION IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION: SCENARIOS FOR NEW
RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN JAPAN, RUSSIA, AND THE UNITED STATES 81 (Belfer Ctr. for Science and Int'l
Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1992).
Significantly, the official Japanese translation of the Article II omitted the word "other" from the
phrase "the other Kurile Islands," providing:
Henceforth the boundary between the two nations shall lie between the islands of Etorofu and
Uruppu. The whole of Etorofu shall belong to Japan, and the Kurile Islands, lying to the north of
and including Uruppu, shall belong to Russia. With regard to Sakhalin Island, rather than
establishing a boundary, historical precedent will continue to be observed.
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, supra note 33, at 4. This alteration has significant implications for
a legally binding definition of the Kurile Islands. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
36 Explanation Asking for the Restoration of the [Habomail Islands & the Kurile Islands, State Dep't
File No. NND760050 (Microfilm), State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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of Sakhalin for the Kurile Islands ("Treaty of St. Petersburg"), which
provided for the mutual cession of territory between Japan and Russia.37
Article II of this treaty provided:
In return for the ceding to Russia of the rights to the island of
Sakhalin... Russia... cedes to... Japan, the group of islands
known as the Kurils. . .. Henceforth the said group of Kuril
Islands shall belong to... Japan. This group shall include the
eighteen islands indicated below, that is: 1) Shumshu ... and
18) [Uruppu].... 38
Thus, the Treaty of St. Petersburg gave Japan full right and title to the
entire Kurile Archipelago, while, in exchange, Japan ceded to Russia any
and all of its claims to Sakhalin Island.
b. The Treaty of Portsmouth
Japan reclaimed the southern half of Sakhalin at the conclusion of the
Russo-Japanese War with the signing of the Treaty of Peace between Japan
and Russia ("Treaty of Portsmouth") on September 5, 1905. 3
2. The Status of the Kuriles During the Second World War
In 1941, the early part of World War II, the Soviet Union and Japan
agreed on the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact.40 However the Soviet Union
renounced the Neutrality Pact when it signed the Agreement regarding Entry
of the Soviet Union into the War against Japan ("Yalta Agreement") on
37 Apr. 25, 1875, Japan-Russ., 149 Consol. T.S. 179 (hereinafter Treaty of St. Petersburg].38 Id. art. II, also available in STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT, supra note 35,
at 9. 39 Sept. 5, 1905, Japan-Russ., 199 Consol. T.S. 144 [hereinafter Treaty of Portsmouth]. The Treaty
provides that "Russia cedes to ... Japan, in perpetuity and full sovereignty, the southern part of the island
of Sakhalin, and all the islands adjacent thereto.... The fiftieth parallel of north latitude is adopted as the
limit of the ceded territory." Also available in STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT,
supra note 35, at 10.
'0 Pact of Neutrality between the U.S.S.R. and Japan, Apr. 14, 1941, available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/sI.htm.
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February 11, 1945.41 Under the Yalta Agreement, the Soviet Union
promised to join the war effort against Japan within two months after
Germany's surrender; in exchange, the United States and United Kingdom
promised to return Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands to the Soviet
Union.
The Soviet Union declared war on Japan on August 8, 1945.42 The
Russian invasion of Shimushu, the northernmost island of the Kurile
Archipelago, began on August 18, three days after Japan surrendered.43 On
August 31, the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fifth Area Army issued
an order placing the 8 9 th Division under the command of the Commander of
the 9 1st Division to facilitate the surrender of the Kurile Islands. Etorofu
was occupied even before this order was issued. Kunashiri, Shikotan and
the Habomais were completely occupied by September 2, 1945 when
General Order No. 1 44 was issued. 45  By September 5, Soviet troops had
taken possession of the entire Kurile Archipelago, including Etorofu,
Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais.
46
41 Crimea (Yalta) Conference, 1945: Entry of Soviet Union into War Against Japan, Feb. 11, 1945,
U.S.-U.S.S.R-U.K., 59 Stat. 1823, 3 Bevans 1022. [hereinafter Yalta Agreement], available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/yalta.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2000), reprinted in Yalta
Agreement on the Kuriles, DEP'T ST. BULL., Feb. 1946, at 282.
42 See Soviet Denunciation of the Pact with Japan, DEP'T ST. BULL., Apr. 1945, at 811 (declaring
denunciation of the neutrality pact between the Soviet Union and Japan). The text is also available at
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/s3.htm (last modified Oct. 28, 2001). See also Press Release,
President Harry S. Truman, Declaration of War on Japan by the Soviet Union, in DEP'T ST. BULL., Aug.
1945, at 207. See also http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/ wwii/s4.htm (last modified Oct. 28, 2001).
43 JOHN J. STEPHAN, THE KURIL ISLANDS 162-64 (1974); MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN,
supra note 33, at 6. See generally Boris Slavinsky, Soviet Occupation of the Kuril Islands,
STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT 42-65 (Belfer Ctr. for Science and Int'l Affairs,
Occasional Paper, 1992).
44 Following General Order No. 1, dated September 2, 1945, which directed Japanese forces in the
Kurile Archipelago to surrender to the Commander in Chief of Soviet Forces in the Far East, an agreement
was reached between the Chief of Staff, Kwantung Army and the Soviet Commander-in-Chief in the Far
East for the local cessation of hostilities and for the surrender of arms. In accordance with that agreement,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese Fifth Area Army ordered the Commander of the 9 1
t Division to
take steps to implement the provisions relating to the local cessation of hostilities and the surrender of arms
in the northern Kurile islands. The northern Kurile islands were soon occupied by the Soviet forces who
then proceeded to take the whole of the Kurile Archipelago, one island after another. Memorandum from
Robert J. McClurkin, Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to U. Alexis Johnson,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, History of Soviet Occupation of the Habomais
and Shikotan at the end of World War II, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 19, 1951) (on file
with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
45 The date of Japan's surrender has appeared differently, ranging from August 28, to September 5,
1945. SLAVINSKY, supra note 43, at 76-84.
46 STEPHAN, supra note 43, at 165-66. For further details on the historical background of the Soviet
Occupation of the Kurile Islands, see SLAVINSKY, supra note 43, at 76-84.
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On September 20, all property on the islands was nationalized, and in
February 1946, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet issued a decree to the
effect that the Kurile Archipelago belonged to the Soviet Union.47 In 1947,
the Kurile Archipelago was incorporated into the South Sakhalin region of
the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. 48 With only a few
exceptions, the approximately 17,000 Japanese on the Kurile Islands49 were
repatriated before 1950.
50
3. 1945 to the Present
The status of the Kurile Islands was addressed in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. Article 2(c) provided that "Japan renounces all right, title and
claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the islands
adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the
Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905. "51 However, it is doubtful
whether the Allied Powers intended to effect the legal disposition of these
territories, since they did not mention by name, who should own them.52 In
addition, the Soviet Union refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty,
and as a result, it was unclear whether the Soviet Union became the
beneficiary of the Japanese renunciation of sovereignty over the Kurile
Islands.
In 1956, the Soviet Union and Japan signed a Joint Declaration that
terminated the state of war between them and resumed diplomatic
relations. 3 This declaration stated that once a peace treaty was concluded,
the Soviet Union would hand over Shikotan and the Habomais, the two
southernmost of the four disputed islands, to Japan. 54 However, the
proposed peace treaty has never been concluded.55
7 Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. on the Creation of the South
Sakhalin Province (Oblast) in the RSFSR Khabarovsk Region (Krai), reprinted in ALLISON, supra note 35.
48 BERTON, supra note 32, at 36.
49 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, supra note 33, at 7.
50 STEPHAN, supra note 43, at 166-69.
5' San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2(c), 3 U.S.T. 3172,136 U.N.T.S. 49
52 For further details on the Allied Powers' policy on the status of Kurile Islands, see generally Fiona
Hill, "A Disagreement between Allies: " The United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet-Japanese
Territorial Dispute, 1945-1956, 14 J.N.E. ASIAN STuDIES 3 (1995).
53 Joint Declaration of Japan and the U.S.S.R., Oct. 19, 1956, Japan-U.S.S.R, http://www.
cgjapankhabarovsk. ru/jprdv/dek 1956.htm.
14 Joint Declaration of Japan and the U.S.S.R, supra note 53, art. 9.
" MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, supra note 33, at 11.
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To date, the territorial dispute over the Kurile Islands remains
unresolved, notwithstanding diplomatic efforts including the visit of
Presidents Mikhail Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin to Japan in 1991 and 1993,
respectively. 56 Remarkably, even though the territory is inhabited by
thousands of people, no serious effort has been or is being made to
determine the inhabitants' preference or otherwise demonstrate a serious
concern for their interests.
4. Weighing the Claims
Japan renounced its claims to the Kuriles in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty. Therefore, if Russia can establish that any of the disputed islands are
properly recognized as part of the Kuriles, the Russian claim to those islands
would be presumptively valid. Similarly, the Japanese must establish that
the disputed islands are properly seen as extensions of Hokkaido.
Unfortunately for both sides, there is no definitive authority for either
proposition. Lacking a contemporary, mutually recognized source for a
conclusive definition, both sides have also tried to fortify their positions by
arguing that the question was settled in the earlier treaties between the two.
For example, the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda states:
Henceforth the frontier between Japan and Russia will run
between the islands of [Etorofu and Uruppu]. The entire island
of [Etorofu] belongs to Japan and the entire island of [Uruppu],
as well as the other Kuril islands to the north of that island,
belong to Russia....
Thus, Russia has attempted to establish a previous Russian claim to Etorofu
and Kunashiri by interpreting the Treaty of Shimoda as an agreement on the
part of Russia to cede to Japan the islands south of Uruppu in the Kurile
Archipelago. 58 Conversely, the term "the other Kuril Islands" in this
56 Id.
7 See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
58 A. SOLOVEv, THE KURILE ISLANDS 9, 11 (1945), quoted in Memorandum, Soviet Claims to
Southernmost Kurile Islands, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 11, 1947) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) (describing the Solovev's book as
"obviously the result of considerable research, probably represent[ing] the official Soviet view or
something approaching it."). See also Memorandum from Robert A. Fearey (Bureau of Far Eastern
Affairs): Southern Kuriles, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 10, 1947) (on file with the U.S.
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provision can be, at least literally, interpreted to mean that among the
currently disputed Kurile Islands-Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the
Habomais-there are certain islands to be labeled as the single entity of the
"Kurile" Islands. As mentioned earlier, the Japanese official translation of
the Treaty of Shimoda omits the word "other" from the phrase "the other
Kurile Islands." 59 Thus, there is a strong presumption that Japan
manipulated the translation for its purpose, so that the first Russo-Japanese
boundary line regarding the Kurile Archipelago excluded the currently
disputed Kurile Islands from the term "Kurile." This presumption is
strengthened by the fact that the translations jointly prepared by the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Russia and of Japan,60 and other translations
in various materials 61 suggest that the Japanese translation is wrong.
The language of Article II of the Treaty of St. Petersburg provided
that "henceforth the said group of Kuril Islands shall belong to ... Japan.
This group shall include the eighteen islands indicated below, that is: 1)
Shumshu... and 18) [Uruppu] .. " This indicates that the islands ceded to
Japan were only one group of the Kurile Archipelago, and that the other
group may well have been either a certain island or islands in the currently
disputed Kurile Islands or even the Kurile Islands themselves as a whole.
Therefore, both treaties are evidence that Etorofu and Kunashiri, at least, are
parts of the Kurile Archipelago, but neither of them gives any clear
indication as to what territory is included in the Kurile Islands.
Therefore, there seems to be no sound legal reason for claiming that
Etorofu and Kunashiri are not part of "the Kurile Islands," the term
employed in the Yalta Agreement. Although there has been no Soviet claim
to the two islands since the Treaty of Shimoda of 1855, which set the
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD); Interests and Attitudes of Far East
Command Powers on Questions relating to the Peace Settlement with Japan (OIR Report No. 4485:
Preliminary Draft), State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 27, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
59 See supra note 35.
60 Foreign Ministry of Japan and Foreign Ministry of the Russian Federation, Joint Compendium of
Documents on the History of the Territorial Demarcation between Russia and Japan by the Ministries of
Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation and of Japan, Doc. No. 1.7 (Belfer Center for Science and
Intemational Affairs, Occasional Paper, 1992).
61 See, e.g., Treaty of Shimoda, supra note 34, 112 Consol. T.S. 467; Briefing Materials for Moscow
Press Working Session, For the Report: Beyond Cold War to Trilateral Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific
Region, STRENGTHENING DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS PROJECT 4 (Belfer Ctr. for Science and Int'l Affairs,
Occasional Paper, 1993); John A. Harrison, JAPAN'S NORTHERN FRONTIER 165 (1953) ("The Island of
Etorofu belongs entirely to Japan, while the Island of Uruppu and other islands of the Kuriles north of this
island belong to Russia .... ).
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frontier in Etorofu Straits north of Etorofu, both that treaty and the Treaty of
St. Petersburg of 1875 indicate that they were considered part of the Kurile
Archipelago.
On the other hand, there is a sound legal basis for claiming that the
Habomais are not properly part of the Kurile Archipelago. The Habomais
were administered as part of Nemuro District of Hokkaido and not joined
politically with the Kurile Archipelago until after Japan's surrender. While
Russia had previously claimed or possessed most of the Kurile Archipelago,
including Etorofu, it never before claimed any part of Shikotan or the
Habomais. Although Japan maintains that Shikotan was included within the
62Kurile Archipelago only for the sake of convenience, there is substantial
evidence supporting the argument that the classification was proper.
In light of the historical records and other evidence, the author
concludes that Etorofu, Kunashiri, and Shikotan were considered to be parts
of the Kurile Archipelago, and the Habomais were recognized as being an
extension of Hokkaido.
a. Etorofu and Kunashiri
Japanese attempts to exclude Etorofu and Kunashiri from the Kurile
Archipelago are not fully supported by even Japanese authorities. For
example, the 1988 edition of Kokushi Dai Jiten (Large Dictionary of
Japanese History) defines the Kurile Archipelago as "[t]wenty-three islands
stretching in one line from the Kamchatka Peninsula to the Japanese
Archipelago, 63 thus excluding the Kurile Islands, and more specifically,
Etorofu and Kunashiri, from the Japanese Archipelago.
Remarks by Japanese officials have also suggested that Etorofu and
Kunashira are properly considered as part of the Kuriles. For example, in
his testimony of October 19, 1951, before the Special Committee on the
Peace Treaty and the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty of the National Diet,
Kumao Nishimura, Director of the Treaties Bureau of the Foreign Ministry
of Japan, observed:
62 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Dec.
29, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
63 9 KOKUSHI DAI JITEN 404-05 (1988). See also BERTON, supra note 32, at 22.
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[B]oth Northern and Southern Kuriles were included in the
scope of the "Chishima Retto" [Kurile Archipelago] named in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. . . Committee Member
Teisuke Takakura wanted confirmation that the "Chishima
Retto" in the San Francisco Peace Treaty was the same as the
"Kuriru Gunto" [the Kurile Archipelago] listed in Article II of
the 1875 Sakhalin-Kurile Exchange Treaty, namely the
eighteen islands north of the Island of Uruppu. Nishimura
summarily denied Takakura's interpretation, stating that . . .
both Northern and Southern Kuriles were included in the
definition of the Kurile Islands listed in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty.
64
Japan's efforts to exclude Etorofu and Kunashiri from the Kurile
Archipelago were also damaged by former Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida
in his speech accepting the San Francisco Peace Treaty on behalf of Japan.
Stressing the territorial question, in particular as to the Kurile Islands,
Yoshida declared, "[Japanese] ownership of two islands of [Etorofu] and
Kunashiri of the South Kurils was not questioned at all by the Czarist
government." 65  This reference to Etorofu and Kunashiri as "Southern
Kuriles" by Prime Minister Yoshida repeatedly appeared in his memoirs; for
example, "Japanese sovereignty over the Southern Kurils was a fact
accepted even by Imperial Russia, while the Hobomai and Shikotan Islands
formed an integral part of Hokkaido....
Other sources that support the inclusion of Etorofu and Kunashiri in
the Kurile Archipelago include:
* Administrative definitions that predominantly included Etorofu
and Kunashiri in the Kurile Archipelago;
67
64 BERTON, supra note 32, at 47.
65 Sigeru Yoshida, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Japan, Verbatim Minutes of the
San Francisco Peace Conference (Sept. 7, 1951), reprinted in ALLISON, supra note 35, at 128.
66 SHIGERU YOSHIDA, THE YOSHIDA MEMOIRS: THE STORY OF JAPAN IN CRISIS 256 (Kenichi
Yoshida trans., 1962).
67 Memorandum, B-29 Study and Japanese Claims to the Southern Kuriles and Habomais, State
Dep't Decimal File No. 661.9413/3-155 CS/E 1955/3/1, State Dcp't Records, Record Group 59 (Mar. 1,
1955) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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* A petition letter to General Douglas MacArthur from Mr. Hidetaro
Bando, Chairman of the Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly,
identifying Etorofu and Kunashiri as "Southern Kurile Islands;,
68
" The report on the Kurile Islands, prepared by the Foreign Office of
the Japanese Government, acknowledging Etorofu and Kunashiri
as part of the southern zone of the Kurile Islands;
69
" A memorandum of the U.S. Department of State concluding that
there seemed to be no sound legal reason for claiming that Etorofu
and Kunashiri are not part of the Kurile Islands, in particular,
based on the Treaty of Shimoda and the Treaty of St. Petersburg,
and thus indicating that they were considered to be part of the
Kurile Islands;
70
" A background report on the Kurile Islands, which included Etorofu
and Kunashiri as part of the Kurile Archipelago, and further stated
that they belonged to the "Southern Kurile Islands;",
71
" The report of a Japanese historian, Irie Keisiro, as reported in
Mainichi of May 17, 1959, to the effect that "Japan has legally
given up the Southern Kurile islands;',
72
" The Japanese Socialist Party's policy statement on treaty
provisions surrendering Japanese sovereignty over territories,
which spoke of "the Kurile Islands, the Habomai Islands, Shikotan
Island;"
68 Hidetaro Bando, Chairman of Hokkaido Prefectural Assembly, to General Douglas MacArthur,
Statement in Request for Return of Habomai Islands and Kurile Islands, State Dep't Records, Record
Group 59 (Mar. 3, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD) [hereinafter Statement in Request for Return of Habomai Islands and Kurile Islands].
69 Foreign Office, Japanese Government, Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part I. The Kurile
Islands, The Habomais and Shikotan (Excerpts), State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 1946) (on
file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
'o Memorandum from Conrad E. Snow, Assistant Legal Advisor for Political Affairs, to Maxwell M.
Hamilton, U.S. Representative on the Far Eastem Commission, Southern Kurile Islands and the Shikotan
Archipelago, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 25, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Southern Kurile Islands and the
Shikotan Archipelago].
71 Explanation Asking for the Restoration of the [Habomai] Islands & the Kurile Islands, supra note
36. 72 Airgram, Northem Territories' Issues, State Dep't File No. Pol 19 Kuril Is, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Nov. 25, 1970) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD).
William J. Sebald, U.S. Political Advisor for Japan, Territorial Provisions of Japanese Peace
Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/10-2650 LWC, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct.
26, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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" A Mainichi public opinion poll conducted in December 1950
indicating that an average of seventy-five percent of the
respondents desired that the Kurile Archipelago be restored to
Japan and lesser majorities seeking the return of the Habomais and
Shikotan;
74
" The resolution adopted by a Japanese national gubernatorial
conference addressing the Kurile Archipelago separately from the
Habomais and Shikotan;
75
" Vice Foreign Minister Ryuen Kusaba's declaration before the
Lower House Foreign Affairs Committee on March 14, 1951 that
"only the Kurile Islands, not the Habomai Group and Shikotan
Islands, were dealt with in the Yalta Agreement;"7 6
" A memorandum of the U.S. Department of State differentiating the
Habomais and Shikotan from Etorofu and Kunashiri, and further
endorsing the inclusion of Etorofu and Kunashiri in the Kurile
Archipelago;
77
* In its advice and consent to the ratification of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, the U.S. Senate mentioned "the Kurile Islands, the
Habomai Islands, the island of Shikotan;"7 8 and
" The Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers ("SCAP") issued
an instruction ("SCAPIN"), No. 677, entitled "Governmental and
74 Niles W. Bond, Acting Counselor of Mission in Japan, Territorial Provisions of the Japanese
Peace Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/1-1551 GB, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59
(Jan. 15, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD)
[hereinafter Territorial Provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty].
75 Survey of Japanese Reservations concerning the Peace Settlement (OIR Report No. 5611), State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 1, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
76 Territorial Aspirations, JIJI PRESS, Mar. 14, 1951 (on file with author).
77 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
78 Memorandum, Kurile Islands, State Dep't Decimal File No. 661.941/8-356, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Aug. 3, 1956) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD). See also STAFF OF FOREIGN RELATIONS COMM., 82D CONG., REPORT OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON EXECUTIVES A, B, C, AND D: JAPANESE PEACE TREATY AND
OTHER TREATIES RELATING TO SECURITY IN THE PACIFIC 8 (2d Sess. 1952) ("It is important to remember
that article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed
Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory. During the negotiation of the treaty
some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its
sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made
of each of them. The committee believes, however, that this would have been unwise course to pursue. It
might have raised differences among the Allies, which would have complicated and prolonged the
conclusion of the peace. Under the circumstances it seems far better to have the treaty enter into force now,
leaving to the future the final disposition of such areas as ... the Kuriles .... ).
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Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan"
on January 29, 1946, which referred to "the Kurile (Chishima)
Islands, the Habomai (Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho,
Yuri, Aki-yuri, Shibotsu and Taraku Islands) and Shikotan
Island. 79
b. Shikotan and the Habomais
At the time of Japan's surrender, Soviet forces occupied the Kurile
Archipelago, including the Habomais and Shikotan. This occupation was
not protested by any Allied Government or by the SCAP, and in fact had
been specifically acknowledged in the determination of the permitted
Japanese fishing area.8 ° In discussing the disposition of the Kurile Islands,
S.W. Boggs, a geographer at the U.S. Department of State, stated that he had
been unable to find any basis for retention of the Habomais by Japan. 81 He
further stated that while he could present no definitive case to prove that
Shikotan was not part of the Kurile Archipelago, he could present no
definitive case to prove that it was part of the Kurile Archipelago either.
82
It is, therefore, more complicated to determine the status of Shikotan
and the Habomais than is the case with Etorofu and Kunashiri. Nonetheless,
the Russian claims to these two islands are somewhat weaker than those of
the Japanese. This is because it is evident that the inclusion of Shikotan and
the Habomais into the Kuriles was done by the Soviet Union for the purpose
of making a claim pursuant to the Yalta Agreement of 1945.83 Also, Russia
79 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, SCAPIN No. 677, Governmental and Administrative
Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan, S SCAP File, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59
(Jan. 29, 1946) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD)
[hereinafter SCAPIN No. 677]. See also infra Part II.A.2.
80 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
a' This statement was made in reply to a suggestion to exclude the Habomais from the Kurile Islands
because of their close association with Japan and in order to allow Japan to retain navigable waters around
its north-eastern extremity. Disposition of the Outlying and Minor Japanese Islands, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Mar. 6, 1946) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD).
2 Consideration, Disposition of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; Disposition of the
Outlying and Minor Japanese Islands, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Mar. 25, 1946) (on file with
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
83 BERTON, supra note 32, at 8.
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never claimed or physically occupied Shikotan or the Habomais before
September 1945.4
The sources supporting the inclusion of Etorofu and Kunashiri in the
Kurile Archipelago, as mentioned earlier,8 5 have the converse effect of
excluding Shikotan and the Habomais from the Kurile Archipelago. There
are other sources supporting this conclusion:
" Memoranda of the U.S. Department of State concluding that
Shikotan and the Habomais were not historically part of the Kurile
Islands;
8 6
" The reality that the Japanese Socialist and People's Democratic
parties have demanded confirmation of Japanese sovereignty over
the Kurile Islands and insisted upon the return of Shikotan and the
Habomais;87 and
" A memorandum of the U.S. Department of State acknowledging
that U.S. sponsorship of Japan's claim to Shikotan and the
Habomais indicated to the Japanese the desire of the United States
to support their claims in this area to the maximum extent
permitted by existing international agreements.88
On the other hand, there also exist sources supporting the inclusion of
Shikotan and the Habomais in the Kurile Archipelago:
" Memorandum from Robert A. Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, to John F. Dulles, Consultant
to the Secretary of State, Sakhalin and the Kuriles, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Mar. 21, 1951)
(on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
85 Memorandum, B-29 Study and Japanese Claims to the Southern Kuriles and Habomais, supra
note 67.
86 Memorandum from Robert A. Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands,
the Habomais and Shikotan, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the
Habomais and Shikotan]; Outgoing Telegram from John F. Dulles, Secretary of State, State Dep't Decimal
File No. 661.941/6-3055, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July 1, 1955) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Outgoing Telegram from
John F. Dulles]; Southern Kurile Islands and the Shikotan Archipelago, supra note 70.
87 Survey of Japanese Reservations concerning the Peace Settlement, supra note 75. On July 31,
1952, at a Plenary Session, the Japanese House of Representatives passed the resolution on returning
Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan. See Foreign Service Dispatch from U.S. Embassy in Tokyo:
Accomplishments of the 13th Diet, State Dep't Decimal File No. 794.21/9-1152, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Sept. 11, 1952) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD).8 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
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" An article in the Oriental Economist, known in Japan as an
influential and conservative publication, regarding Russian
occupation of Shikotan and the Habomais in the "Kurile group;"
89
" A memorandum of the U.S. Department of State on the question of
the Kurile Islands, in which the Geographer's Office stated that
there is no reason to separate the southern and central islands from
the northern islands;90 and
" The fact that the waters of Shikotan and the Habomais and of
Etorofu and Kunashiri constitute a unit for fishing operations. 91
There is a convincing argument, however, that Shikotan cannot be
claimed as part of Hokkaido. Accordingly, the status of Shikotan and the
Habomais are examined separately.
i. Shikotan
Although Japan maintains that Shikotan is geologically an extension
of Cape Nosappu of Hokkaido, 92 many historical documents support a
contrary conclusion. Administrative records of Shikotan show that it and the
Kurile Archipelago were governed jointly under the Branch of the Hokkaido
Administration. 93 For example, Shikotan was brought under the Hanasaki-
gun of Nemuro-Koku in 1869, and later it was changed to Shikotan-gun,
Kamichishima-Koku in 1885. The village head office of Shakotan-village
(Shikotan) was established in 1887. 94 In July 1880, six villages were set up
in Tomari of Kunashiri, and four villages' offices were established out of
Tomari. After many changes, the Hokkaido second class-municipality
system was enforced from April 1, 1923, in: Tomari village and Ruyabetsu
of Kunashiri; Shakotan village (Shikotan); Rubetsu village, Sana village,
and Shibetoro village of Etorofu. On November 1, 1933, the name of
Shakotan village was changed to Shikotan village and in June 1943, the
8' Survey of Japanese Reservations concerning the Peace Settlement, supra note 75.
9o Consideration, Disposition of the Paracel and Spratly Islands, State Dep't Records, Record Group
59 (Feb. 14, 1946) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD).
9, Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
92 KOKUSHI DAi JITEN, supra note 63, at 405; see also BERTON, supra note 32, at 22.
93 BERTON, supra note 32, at 25.
94 Statement in Request for Return of Habomai Islands and Kurile Islands, supra note 68.
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Hokkaido municipality system was established. 95  Thus, the islands of
Kunashiri, Etorofu and Shikotan were under the municipality system. 96
The inclusion of Shikotan in the Kurile Archipelago is also supported
by:
" An office memorandum of the U.S. Department of State on
substantive problems that categorized the available options as "the
southern Kurils and the Habomais," or "the lower Kurils and [the]
Habomais; ' 97
* A background report on the Kurile Islands that referred to
"Habomai islands and southern Kurile islands," or "Habomai
Island and Kurile Archipelagoes;"
98
" The authoritative multi-volume Russian "Large Encyclopedia" that
includes Shikotan in the Kurile Archipelago; 99
* Various pre- 1945 Japanese publications.100
ii. The Habomais
The small secondary chain of islands, immediately to the east of
Hokkaido and to the south of Kunashiri, is known as the Habomai
group/Habomais (also as "Suisho" or "Goyomai" Islands). The argument
that the Habomais are an extension of Hokkaido is supported by the
following sources:
* Mr. Dulles stated at the San Francisco Peace Conference that the
U.S. interpretation of the words "Kurile Islands" excluded the
Habomais;10o
95 Explanation Asking for the Restoration of the [Habomai] Islands & the Kurile Islands, supra note
36. 96 For the argument that Shikotan was included with the southern Kurile Archipelagos for the sake of
the administrative convenience, see Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the Habomais and Shikotan, supra note
86.
97 Memorandum, Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/8-
3149, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 31, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
98 Explanation Asking for the Restoration of the [Habomai] Islands & the Kurile Islands, supra note
36.
99 BERTON, supra note 32, at 25.
10o Id.
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" Administratively, the Habomais were part of Hokkaido since at
least 1894; 102
" The Habomais are geologically older than the rugged, often
precipitous, Kurile Islands and apparently constitute an extension
of the eastern Hanasaki Peninsula of Hokkaido;103 and
" A statement by the Social Democratic Party's Secretary General,
specifically demanding the return of the Habomais.
10 4
There is also an argument that the Habomais have no relation to the
phrase "The Kurile" in the Yalta Agreement, since these islands may have
been under the occupation of the Supreme Commander of U.S. Army &
Navy, through the General Order No. 1, as a part of the minor islands close
to mainland Japan.
°5
B. The Senkaku Islands
The Senkaku Islands are a group of eight uninhabited islands,
comprising five small volcanic islands and three rocky outcroppings, 10 6 with
a total land area of 6.32 square kilometers located in the East China Sea,
scattered about in the area from 250 40' to 260 North latitude and from 123'
25' to 1240 45' East longitude, approximately 200 kilometers northeast of
Taiwan and 300 kilometers west of the Okinawa. 10 7  If considered to be
1o1 See Memorandum, Kurile Islands, supra note 78 (mentioning Southern Kurile, Shikotan, and the
Habomais, respectively, as well as Etorofu and Kunashiri, as "the fairly large islands of the Southern
Kuriles"). See also Airgram to US Department of State from US Consulate in Sapporo, Value of the
Southern Kuriles, Shikotan and the Habomais to Japan, State Dep't File No. Pol 32-1 Japan-USSR; Pol 2
Kuril Is, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (May 14, 1964) (on file with the U.S. National Archives
and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
102 Explanation Asking for the Restoration of the [Habomai] Islands & the Kurile Islands, supra note
36; Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the Habomais and Shikotan, supra note 86.
103 Memorandum from Samuel W. Boggs, Special Advisor on Geography, Office of Intelligence
Research, Disposition of the Kuriles in the Treaty with Japan, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (June
23, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD)
[hereinafter Disposition of the Kuriles in the Treaty with Japan].
"' Territorial Provisions of the Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 74.
105 Explanation Asking for the Restoration of the [Habomail Islands & the Kurile Islands, supra note
36.
106 The term "Senkaku Islands" is the collective name for Uotsuri-shima/Tiaoyutai, Kuba-shima (or
Kobi-sho)/FHuangweiyu, Taisho-jima (or Akao-sho)/Chihweiyu, Kita-kojima/Beixiao Dao, Minami-kojima
(or Minami-koshima)/Nanxiao Dao, Oki-no-Kita-Iwa/Dabeixiao Dao, Oki-no-Minami-IwaDananxiao Dao,
and Tobise/Feilai Dao. See Dzurek, supra note 5, at 4; SUGANUMA, supra note 5, at 12.
107 SUGANUMA, supra note 5, at 11.
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"islands" under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention, 10 sovereignty over the
Senkaku Islands could affect 20,750 square nautical miles of marine
space,'0 9 and the vast mineral resources in that area. The on-going territorial
dispute among Japan, China, and Taiwan" 0 over the Senkaku Islands, which
are occupied by Japan, involves a number of significant issues, including
future offshore oil development. This dispute has impeded the stability of
East Asia, and, in particular, Japan's bilateral relations in the region.
1. Territorial Status of the Senkaku Islands Prior to 1945
Historically, as early as the Sixteenth century, three of the Senkaku
Islands, namely, Uotsuri-shima, Kuba-shima, and Taisho-jima, were
specifically mentioned by their Chinese names-Tiaoyutai, Huangweiyu,
and Chihweiyu-in the travel accounts of the Chinese envoys sent by the
Ming Dynasty to hold investiture ceremonies for the kings of the Ryukyu
Islands. l"' The Chinese envoys usually proceeded to the Ryukyu Islands
from Fuchou, via Taiwan and the islets to the northeast of Taiwan, including
Tiaoyutai, Huangweiyu, and Chihweiyu."l 2 These Tiaoyutai islets were then
considered the boundary separating Taiwan from the Ryukyu Islands."13
10 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. The dates of ratification of the Law of the Sea
Convention by the disputants over the Senkaku Islands are as follows: China (June 7, 1996, with
declaration), Japan (June 20, 1996). See Chronological List of Ratifications, Accessions and Successions to
the Convention and their Regional Groups, as at 30 November 1998, 38 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 4
(1999). It is interesting to note that Article 3 of China's declaration states: "The People's Republic of
China reaffirms its sovereignty over all its archipelagos and islands as listed in Article 2 of the Law of the
People's Republic of China on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone, which was promulgated on 25
February 1992." U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA, THE LAW OF THE SEA:
DECLARATIONS AND STATEMENTS WITH RESPECT TO THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA AND TO THE AGREEMENT RELATING TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PART XI OF THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA OF 10 DECEMBER 1982, at23 (1997).
'(9 JANE'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 10, at 35.
110 Without prejudice to their respective claims, this article treats China and Taiwan as separate
entities.
" 1 JANE'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 10, at 49.
112 For details of the Chinese investiture mission to the Ryukyu Islands during the Ming and Qing
Dynasties, see SUGANUMA, supra note 5, at 45-87; A Note to U.S. Secretary of State from Chow Shu-kai,
Taiwanese Ambassador in U.S., State Dep't File No. Pol 32-6 Senkaku Is, State Dep't Records, Record
Group 59 (May 14, 1964) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD).
113 SUGANUMA, supra note 5, at 49-85.
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As a result of its defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, China ceded
Taiwan to Japan under the Treaty of Shimonoseki in May 1895.114 Article 11
of the Treaty of Shimonoseki provided that "China cedes to Japan in
perpetuity and full sovereignty the following territories: ... (b) The island of
Formosa, together with all islands appertaining or belonging to the said
island of Formosa.... In the meantime, following a January 14, 1895
Japanese Cabinet Decision to erect a marker on the Senkaku Islands, the
islands were formally incorporated into Yaeyama County, Okinawa
Prefecture.1 16 Since 1896, they have been a part of Ishigaki City.
2. Postwar Disposition of the Senkaku Islands
Taiwan was returned to China at the end of World War II in 1945,
based upon the 1943 Cairo Declaration and the 1945 Potsdam Proclamation.
Japan accepted the terms of the Cairo Declaration to the effect that "Japan
shall be stripped of ... all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,
such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores, [which] shall be restored
to the Republic of China.""' 7 In the Potsdam Proclamation, the signatories
affirmed that the terms of the Cairo Declaration would be carried out and
limited Japanese sovereignty to the four major islands of Japan and to "such
minor islands as we determine.
'' 18
Although the Allied Powers did not specifically mention disposition
of the Senkaku Islands in the territorial clause of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, they did decide to place the Senkaku Islands under U.S.
administration. Article 2(b) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, signed by
neither China nor Taiwan, simply states that "Japan renounces all right, title
and claim to Formosa and Pescadores."'1 19 Article 3 provided:
114 Apr. 17, 1895, Japan-China, 181 Consol. T.S. 217 [hereinafter Treaty of Shimonoseki], available
at http://newtaiwan.virtualave.net/shimonoseki0 l.htm.
'
5 181 Consol. T.S. at 218. "Formosa" is the old name of Taiwan. Today, the term is sometimes
used with reference to the main island of Taiwan.
116 MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, JAPAN, supra note 5.
17 First Cairo Conference, Dec. 1, 1943, 3 Bevans 858, reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, A
DECADE OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: 1941-1949, BASIC DOCUMENTS 20 (1950) [hereinafter A DECADE
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY], available at http://www.yale.edui/lawweb/avalon/wwii/cairo.htm.
[hereinafter Cairo Declaration].
118 Terms for Japanese Surrender, July 26, 1945, para. 8, 3 Bevans 1204 [hereinafter Potsdam
Proclamation].
"' San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2(b), 3 U.S.T. 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 49.
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Japan will concur in any proposal of the United States to the
United Nations to place under its trusteeship system, with the
United States as the sole administering authority, Nansei Shoto
south of 29 deg. north latitude (including the Ryukyu Islands
and the Daito Islands). . . . Pending the making of such a
proposal and affirmative action thereon, the United States will
have the right to exercise all and any powers of administration,
legislation and jurisdiction over the territory and inhabitants of
these islands, including their territorial waters. 20
The term "Nansei Shoto" was understood by the United States and
Japan to include the Senkaku Islands, which were being administered as a
part of Okinawa Prefecture. The U.S. Civil Administration Proclamation
No. 27, of December 25, 1953, further defined the territorial jurisdiction of
the U.S. Civil Administration of the Ryukyu Islands and the Government of
the Ryukyu Islands as "those islands, islets, atolls and reefs as well as their
territorial waters" within specific geographic coordinates that included the
Senkaku Islands. 121
The status of the Senkaku Islands received little attention in the 1950s
and 1960s. That changed when the Economic Commission for Asia and the
2 Id. art. 3,3 U.S.T. 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 51
121 Proclamation No. 27, (Dec. 25, 1953), On the Geographical Boundary of the Ryukyu Islands,
provides:
To the inhabitants of the Ryukyu Islands, I, Major General David Ogden, Deputy President of
United States Civil Administration in the Ryukyu Islands acting under the authority of the
President of the Civil Administration, bearing in mind the necessity, arising from the provisions
of the Treaty of Peace with Japan, which was signed on 8 September 1951 and the Agreement
with Japan on the Amami Islands, which enters into force on 25 December 1953, to redefine the
geographical boundary of United States Civil Administration and the Government of Ryukyu,
which has so far been determined by proclamations, orders and regulations of the Civil
Administration, hereby proclaim as follows:
1. The jurisdiction of United States Civil Administration in the Ryukyu Islands and the
Government of Ryukyu is redefined to be limited to those islands, islets, atolls and reefs as well
as their territorial waters within the following geographical boundary, which starts from 28
Degrees North, 124 Degrees 40 Minutes East; going through 24 Degrees North, 122 Degrees
East; 24 Degrees North, 133 Degrees East; 27 Degrees North, 131 Degrees 50 Minutes East; 27
Degrees North, 128 Degrees 18 Minutes East; 28 Degrees North, 128 Degrees 18 Minutes East,
and comes back to the starting point.
2. Any proclamation, order, regulation, directive or any other provision of United States
Civil Administration in the Ryukyu Islands, which has set up a boundary or ordered the exercise
of its jurisdiction beyond the said boundary, shall be amended following the previous section.
3. This proclamation enters into force on 25 December 1953.
VOL. I11 No. I
SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY
Far East of the United Nations Economic and Social Council suggested the
possible existence of large hydrocarbon deposits in the waters off the
Senkaku Islands. After extensive surveys in 1968 and 1969, it was reported
that the shallow sea floor between Japan and Taiwan might contain
substantial deposits of petroleum, perhaps comparable to the Persian Gulf
area.' 22 The prospect of oil moved the three nations to declare the priority of
their claims.
23
The end of the American occupation of Okinawa also served to
escalate the war of words. The Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands
and Daito Islands,124 signed by the United States and Japan on June 17,
1971, included the Senkaku Islands as part of Okinawa. Both China and
Taiwan challenged the legitimacy of the transfer.
Recently, there have been occasional flare-ups in the dispute, sparked
by actions such as provocative visits to the disputed islands by nationals of
the claimants. Japan and China sought to defuse the dispute by signing a
provisional fisheries agreement in November 1997.125 Though it resulted in
a harsh reaction by Taiwan, it was agreed that formal delimitation of the
exclusive economic zone would be deferred, joint management of the area
between 300 40' North and 27' North and beyond 52 nautical miles from the
coasts of Japan and China would be provided, and traditional fishing
activities would be continued in the vicinity of the disputed islands, with
joint setting of fishing quotas for that area.
2 6
C. The Liancourt Rocks
The Liancourt Rocks include two tiny rocky islets, the East Island
(Tongdo/Onnajima) and the West Island (Sodo/Otokojima), as well as
numerous small reefs. The Liancourt Rocks are located 93 kilometers east
122 Report of the Sixth Session of the Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral
Resources in Asian Offshore Areas, U.N. Doc. E/CN.1 l/L.239 (1970), at 51-67; see also Park, supra note
4, at 248-49; SUGANUMA, supra note 5, at 129-3 1.
123 Memorandum to Ambassador Johnson from Winthrop G. Brown, Chronology of Events relating
to Status of the Senkaku Islands, State Dep't File No. Pol 32-6 Senkaku Is; XR Pol 19 Ryu Is, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (June 7, 1971) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD). See also SUGANUMA, supra note 5, at 131-35.
124 Agreement Concerning the Ryukyu Islands and the Daito Islands, June 17, 1971, U.S.-Japan, 23
T.I.A.S. 475.
125 Agreement on Fisheries, Nov. 11, 1997, China-Japan, reprinted in 41 JAPANESE ANNUAL INT'L L.
122 (1998).
126 JANE'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 10, at 102-03.
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of Korea's Ullung Island and 157 kilometers northwest of Japan's Oki
Islands. Korea and Japan have contested the ownership of Liancourt Rocks,
which are currently occupied by Korea, since the end of World War II.
Korea's status as a former colony of Japan has complicated the dispute
because after 1910 there was no border between the two countries.
Therefore, in contrast to the disputes over the Kuriles and the Senkakus, the
two parties have relied on the priority of their historical claims, rather than
invoking the favorable interpretation of treaties.
Under the terms of the Law of the Sea Convention, the outcome of
maritime boundary disputes often depends on the ownership and
classification of islands or rocks capable of sustaining human habitation or
economic life.' 27  As a result, sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks has
become increasingly important, although the size of their territory is
relatively small. 128 If considered to be "islands" under the Law of the Sea
Convention, ownership of the Liancourt Rocks could affect 16,600 square
nautical miles of marine space. 12 9 Thus, the issues at stake in the Liancourt
Rocks dispute go beyond mere national pride.
1. The Status of the Liancourt Rocks Prior to 1945
Japan annexed Korea in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War in a
series of agreements made between 1904 and 1910.130 During this period,
127 Law of the Sea Convention, supra note 9, art. 121(1), 21 I.L.M. at 1291.
.28 The total area is 186,121 square meters. See Lee, supra note 6, at 4.
129 JANE'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 10, at 171; see also JOHNSTON & VALENCIA,
supra note 3, at 113.30 Protocol Concluded between Japan and Korea, Regarding the Situation of Korea, Feb 23, 1904,
Japan-Korea, reprinted in JOHN M. MAKI, CONFLICT AND TENSION IN THE FAR EAST: KEY DOCUMENTS,
1894-1960 23-24 (1961), provides:
Article I. [T]he Imperial Government of Korea shall place full confidence in the Imperial
Government of Japan and adopt the advice of the latter in regard to improvements in
administration . . . Article IV. In case the welfare of the Imperial House of Korea or the
territorial integrity of Korea is endangered by aggression of a third Power or by internal
disturbances, the Imperial Government of Japan shall immediately take such necessary measures
as the circumstances require, and in such cases the Imperial Government of Korea shall give full
facilities to promote the action of the Imperial Japanese Government: The Imperial Government
of Japan may, for the attainment of the above-mentioned objects, occupy, when the
circumstances require it, such places as may be necessary from strategical [sic] points of view.
The Treaty of Annexation, Aug. 22, 1910, Japan-Korea, reprinted in MAKI, supra, at 24-25, provides:
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Japan specifically laid its claim to the Liancourt Rocks by officially
incorporating them into Shimane Prefecture. A Cabinet Decision on January
28, 1905 and the Shimane Prefecture Notice 40, issued on February 22,
1905, declared that the island 85 miles northwest of the Oki Islands should
be designated as "Takeshima" and be placed under the jurisdiction of the
head of Oki Islands. 131 During World War II, the 1943 Ca'iro Declaration'
32
primarily decided the terms of territorial disposition with respect to Korea.
The Potsdam Proclamation, 133 in stating: "Japanese sovereignty shall be
limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu and Shikoku, and such
minor islands as we determine," indicated that other minor Japanese islands
might be detached from Japan, at the discretion of the Allied Powers .
34
2. The Postwar Status of the Liancourt Rocks
The status of the Liancourt Rocks was not addressed in Article 2(a) of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty. 135 Instead, the treaty provided that "Japan,
recognizing the independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim
to Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, 136 Port Hamilton 131 and
Dagelet."'138 Following Japan's surrender, the Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers removed the Liancourt Rocks from Japanese jurisdiction, and
U.S. armed forces controlled and used the area as a bombing range.
39
On January 18, 1952, President Syngman Rhee of Korea issued the
Korean Presidential Proclamation of Sovereignty over the Adjacent Sea,
creating the so-called "Peace Line" or "Syngman Rhee Line," which claimed
Article I. His Majesty the Emperor of Korea makes complete and permanent cession to His
Majesty the Emperor of Japan of all rights of sovereignty over the whole of Korea. Article II.
His Majesty the Emperor of Japan accepts the cession mentioned in the preceding article, and
consents to the complete annexation of Korea to the Empire of Japan.
131 Kazuo Hori, Japan's Incorporation of Takeshima into Its Territory in 1905, 28 KOREA OBSERVER
524 (1997); Hideki Kajimura, The Question of TakeshimaiTokdo, 28 KOREA OBSERVER 456-61 (1997).
132 Cairo Declaration, supra note 117, 3 Bevans 858.
133 Potsdam Proclamation, supra note 118, 3 Bevans 1205.
:34 Id. para 8.
35 San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2(a), 3 U.S.T. 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 49.
36 Cheju Island in Korean.
3' Keomun Island in Korean.
138 Ullung Island in Korean.
13' Division of Research for Far East, Office of Intelligence Research, DRF Information Paper No.
326, Notes on Certain Islands Adjacent to or Formerly Occupied by Japan (Unedited Draft), State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Apr. 19, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
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Korean jurisdiction over waters within a line running an average of 60
nautical miles from the Korean coast. 140 Aimed principally at excluding the
Japanese from the Sea of Japan/East Sea, the Rhee Line explicitly stated
Korea's claim to the Liancourt Rocks. Japan responded by protesting
Korea's unilateral proclamation of jurisdiction over the high seas, and by
declaring its non-recognition of the Korean claim to the Liancourt Rocks.'
4
'
Korea has taken numerous steps to develop the disputed area since
1952, including the recent construction of a wharf on the Liancourt Rocks.
There has also been the continuous Korean presence on the Liancourt Rocks
of at least one or two fishing families and a permanent coastguard.
Despite disagreement over the ownership of the Liancourt Rocks, the
two claimants signed the Treaty on Basic Relations between Korea and
Japan on June 22, 1965, which normalized their diplomatic relations. 142 The
treaty did not address the status of the Liancourt Rocks.1
43
The territorial dispute over the Liancourt Rocks resurfaced in 1996 as
a consequence of new, revised and modified exclusive economic zone
("EEZ") claims 144 by both sides in the wake of the ratification of the Law of
the Sea Convention. 145 In particular, Japan's declaration of an EEZ
represented a marked departure from its previous policy of restraint
regarding territorial issues.' 46 Japan's EEZ claims were construed by Korea
140 The full text reprinted in CHI YOUNG PAK, THE KOREAN STRAITS 126 (1988). For a map, see id.
at 16-20.
14' THE PRACTICE OF JAPAN IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1961-1970, supra note 3, at 67-71.
142 Treaty on Basic Relations between Korea and Japan, June 22, 1965, Korea-Japan, 583 U.N.T.S.
33.
143 See id.
'4" For the most recent EEZ claims by the disputants over the Liancourt Rocks, refer to the following
legislation: Exclusive Economic Zone Act, No. 5151 (1996) (Korea), reprinted in JANE'S EXCLUSIVE
ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 10, at 171; Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf,
No. 74 (1996) (Japan), reprinted in 35 LAW OF THE SEA BULLETIN 94 (1997).
14' 21 I.L.M 1261, supra note 9. See supra note 144 for the dates of ratification.
146 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf, No. 74, states that Japan's EEZ:
[C]omprises the areas of the sea extending from the baseline of Japan ... to the line every point
of which is 200 nautical miles from the nearest point on the baseline of Japan (excluding
therefrom the territorial sea) and its subjacent seabed and subsoil. Provided that, where any part
of that line lies beyond the median line ... as measured from the baseline of Japan, the median
line (or the line which may be agreed upon between Japan and a foreign country as a substitute
for the median line) shall be substituted for that part of the line.
See supra note 144. The law defines the median line as "the line every point of which is equidistant from
the nearest point on the baseline of Japan and the nearest point on the baseline from which the breadth of
the territorial sea pertaining to the foreign coast of Japan is measured." Id.
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as an attempt to usurp Korean sovereignty over the disputed territory, and
provoked a harsh response.
More recently, Korea and Japan signed a fisheries agreement, which
took effect on January 22, 1999.47 This agreement sets quotas for each
state's fishermen in the other's EEZ and establishes a joint fishing zone
around the Liancourt Rocks.
48
3. Competing Claims to the Liancourt Rocks
The official Korean position is that at one time the Liancourt Rocks
were part of the Kingdom of Korea. 149 Korea's claims are based on
numerous Korean historical records, including some written in the eighth
century, indicating that the Liancourt Rocks became part of Korea in 512
A.D. Additionally, Korea asserts that various maps verify its title to both the
Liancourt Rocks and Ullung Island, of which, Korea argues, the Liancourt
Rocks are appendages.15
0
On the other hand, Japan's historical claims are based on records
documenting Japanese ownership of the Liancourt Rocks from 1650, which
indicate the granting of the Liancourt Rocks to what is known today as
Tottori Prefecture.
Japan established straight baselines around much of its coast by means of its Law Amending the Law
on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (1996). Some of these straight baselines are in excess of 50
nautical miles in length and connect islands, which are arguably remote from the mainland coastline. Japan
has not, however, provided details of the precise extent of its EEZ claim. See BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE
AND RESEARCH, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 120 LIMITS IN THE SEAS 3-18 (1998). For charts showing Japanese
territorial seas and straight baselines, see http://www.jhd.go.jp/cue/ENGAN/ryokai/ tokutei/tokutei2.html
(last visited Jan. 7, 2001), http://www.jhd.go.jp/cue/ENGAN/ryokai/kakudai2/itiran2.html (last visited Jan.
7,2001); and see also JANE'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 10, at 102-03.
147 Agreement on Fisheries, Jan. 22, 1999, Japan-Korea, reprinted in HEE KWON PARK, THE LAW OF
THE SEA AND NORTHEAST ASIA 215-23 (2000).148 JANE'S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONES, supra note 10, at 171.
"9 For further information on the historical background of Korea, see generally HORACE H. ALLEN,
A CHRONOLOGICAL INDEX: SOME OF THE CHIEF EVENTS IN THE FOREIGN INTERCOURSE OF KOREA FROM
THE BEGINNING OF THE CHRISTIAN ERA TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (1901); 1-2 HOMER B. HULBERT,
THE HISTORY OF KOREA (1905); YOSHI S. KUNO, JAPANESE EXPANSION ON THE ASIATIC CONTINENT
(1937-1940); M. FREDERICK NELSON, KOREA AND THE OLD ORDERS IN EASTERN ASIA (1945).
'50 See generally Hoon Lee, Dispute over Territorial Ownership of Tokdo in the Late Choson Period,
28 KOREA OBSERVER 389-92 (1997); Yong-Ha Shin, A Historical Study of Korea's Title to Tokdo, 28
KOREA OBSERVER 333-48 (1997). See also John M. Steeves, First Secretary of US Embassy in Japan,
Foreign Service Despatch [sic] from US Embassy, Japan, Koreans on Liancourt Rocks, State Dep't
Decimal File No. 694.9513/10-352, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 3, 1952) (on file with the
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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Japan also relies on other pre-nineteenth century documents providing
evidence of Japanese fishermen's use of the Liancourt Rocks during the
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries, and Japanese hunting of sea lions on
the Liancourt Rocks during the early twentieth century. 151
III. TERRITORIAL DISPOSITIONS AND THE SAN FRANCISCO PEACE TREATY
WITH JAPAN OF 1951
A. The Wartime Declarations
There was general agreement that the San Francisco Peace Treaty
could only endorse the territorial agreements made at Cairo, Yalta, and
Potsdam.152 In fact, the territorial dispositions of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty followed the terms of these agreements and U.S. studies and policy
decisions relating to the implementation of these agreements. 5
3
The pertinent provisions of these agreements are: "Japan will ... be
expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and
greed" in the Cairo Declaration on December 1, 1943;114 "The Kuril islands
shall be handed over to the Soviet Union" in the Yalta Agreement of
February 11, 1945;' 55 "Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands of
Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we
determine" in the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945; 156 and
"[Japan] . . . accept[s] the provisions set forth in the [Potsdam
Proclamation]" in the Japanese government's statement accepting U.S. terms
of surrender, dated August 14, 1945.157
:12 See generally Honi, supra note 131, at 477-88; Kajimura, supra note 131, at 423-35.
52 Oral communication from Hubert Graves, Counselor, British Embassy, to Hugh Borton, Acting
Special Assistant to the Director, Office of Far Eastern Affairs, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW
(PEACE)/10-847, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 8, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).1 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
See Cairo Declaration, supra note 117, 3 Bevans 858.
s Yalta agreement, supra note 41, 59 Stat. 1823, 3 Bevans 1022, art. 3.136 Potsdam Proclamation, supra note 118, para. 8, 3 Bevans 1205.
157 Press Release, President Harry S. Truman, Japanese Acceptance of Potsdam Declaration, in DEP'T
ST. BULL., Aug. 1945, at 255.
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1. The Cairo Declaration
The Cairo Declaration referred specifically only to "the territories
Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the
Pescadores," although it did add "Japan will also be expelled from all other
territories which she has taken by violence and greed."' 158 As to the words of
the Cairo Declaration, there were harsh responses from Japan, for example,
"the expulsion of Japan from the territory which she took by violence and
greed is difficult for the Japanese to understand, since all countries have
acquired additional territory in such a way." 159
It is quite correct to say that Japan did not acquire the Kurile Islands
by violence, but it might be well to remember that they were, for a century, a
matter of dispute with Russia. Moreover, the 1855 Treaty of Shimoda set
the frontier between the two countries between the islands of Etorofu and
Uruppu, leaving the Kurile Islands to Japan, and the eighteen northern
islands in the Kurile Archipelago, beginning with Uruppu, to Russia. The
northern islands in the Kurile Archipelago remained Russian until the Treaty
of St. Petersburg in 1875, when, in exchange for Japanese claims to
Sakhalin, they were ceded to Japan.
2. The Yalta Agreement
Russia maintains that, as a result of the Yalta Agreement, the Kurile
Islands became an integral part of Russia. As mentioned earlier, the basis of
the Russian claim to these islands is a passage in the Yalta Agreement made
by the leaders of the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States:
2. The former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous
attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored, viz.:
(a) the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands
adjacent to it shall be returned to the Soviet Union....
3. The Kuril Islands shall be handed over to the Soviet Union.
158 See Cairo Declaration, supra note 117, 3 Bevans 858.
'59 William J. Sebald, U.S. Political Advisor for Japan, Views on Peace Treaty with Japan, State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Feb. 10, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
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A report on the discussions at Yalta concerning the Kurile
Archipelago by Charles E. Bohlen 160 notes a conversation between
Roosevelt and Stalin on February 8, 1945, in the following terms:
MARSHAL STALIN said that he would like to discuss the
political conditions under which the U.S.S.R. would enter the
war against Japan .... THE PRESIDENT said . . . that there
would be no difficulty whatsoever in regard to the . . . Kurile
Islands going to Russia at the end of the war .... 16
A memorandum by Mr. W. Averell Harriman 162 concerning the events
of February 10, 1945, contained the following statement:
Mr. Molotov' 63 . . . handed me an English translation of the
draft of Marshal Stalin's political conditions for Russia's entry
in the war against Japan as discussed with the President in
February.... The Kuril Islands should be handed over to the
Soviet Union. The Heads of the three Great Powers have
agreed that these claims of the Soviet Union should be
unquestionably satisfied after Japan has been defeated.1
64
In that context, it could be argued that, on a historical basis, certain
Kurile Islands never belonged to the Soviet Union, have always been
administered by Japan, and, therefore, should not be included in the group
now occupied by Soviet forces and ceded at Yalta. Furthermore, there is no
distinct evidence that the minds of any of the negotiators at Yalta were ever
directed to the term "Kuril Islands." The question is therefore a legal one.
The definition of the words "Kuril Islands" should be determined on the
basis of all relevant considerations. Since all of the islands in the Kurile
Archipelago were part of Japan before the war, they should be retained by
Japan unless they are part of the "Kuril Islands" within the meaning of the
1"o Counselor of the Department of State.
161 Memorandum, Yalta Discussions concerning the Kuriles, State Dep't File No. RM-54/2, State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July 20, 1953) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
162 U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union.
163 Vyacheslav Mikhailovich Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union.
'64 Memorandum, Yalta Discussions concerning the Kuriles, supra note 161.
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Yalta Agreement.165 It should be also noted that the "Kuril Islands" were
dealt with in a paragraph separate from that which stated that the former
rights of Russia violated by Japan in 1904 should be restored.
3. The Potsdam Proclamation
The Potsdam Proclamation indicated that other minor Japanese islands
might be detached from Japan at the discretion of the Allied Powers. As for
the other areas, it was stipulated only that Japan should renounce right, title
and claim to them, and no reference was made to their status following such
renunciation.
The Soviet Union purported to adhere to the surrender terms of the
Potsdam Proclamation in its declaration of war. From the Japanese
government's statement accepting U.S. terms of surrender it appears that the
power of the Potsdam signatories to determine which islands should remain
under Japanese sovereignty rested not upon legal rights, but upon the
political fact that they spoke for the great powers which were in a position to
determine the peace settlement. Such legal force as the declaration has
would appear to arise from its unconditional acceptance by Japan. It follows
from this acceptance that Japan should abide by any determination by the
Allied Powers concerning limits of its territory.
4. Competing Interpretations Regarding the Legal Effect of the Wartime
Resolutions
Should the Yalta Agreement, which was not known to Japan at the
time of its acceptance of the Potsdam Proclamation, and which was not
referred to in the Potsdam Proclamation, be considered the relevant
determination by the Allied Powers as envisaged in paragraph 8 of the
Potsdam Proclamation? And further, could the Soviet Union singly and
unilaterally determine acquisition of the Kurile Islands as its own territory
by strength of the provisions of paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation?
The legal nature of the Yalta Agreement is also debatable. Was it a simple
statement of common purpose arrived at by the heads of three Great Powers,
or did it have certain legal effects on the issue of transferring territories?
65 Southern Kurile Islands and the Shikotan Archipelago, supra note 70.
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The United States maintains that the Yalta Agreement was not meant
to be self-executing or a final determination of the purposes expressed
therein, or to be of any legal effect in transferring territories. On the other
hand, by virtue of the British constitutional system, the Prime Minister of the
United Kingdom may have bound his Government at Yalta as to the
disposition of the Kurile Islands. 166 Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier,
though the Soviet Union maintained that as a result of the Yalta Agreement
the Kurile Islands became an integral part of the Soviet Union, it is doubtful
that the Soviet Union could determine by unilateral declaration the
acquisition of the Kurile Islands. However, "[t]he Soviet Union could...
acquire sovereignty over those territories on an independent basis of
occupation, control, and effective administration, or it could acquire
prescriptive title."'
' 67
As to the question of whether the United States agreed in the Yalta
Agreement that these islands belonged to the Soviet Union, "the United
States has consistently maintained that with respect to Japan, neither the
Yalta Agreement nor the San Francisco Peace Treaty was intended to nor
did it have the effect of conveying legal title in any Japanese territory to the
Soviet Union. The phrase 'Kurile Islands' in those documents was not
intended to include these islands, which have always been part of Japan.' 68
At a meeting of the Japanese Foreign Affairs Committee of the House
of Representatives, Mr. Kawamura, Parliamentary Vice Minister of Foreign
1 Hill, supra note 52, at 9-14. For further information on the United Kingdom and other
Commonwealth countries' opinions on this issue, see Incoming Telegram from Ambassador Butler in
Canberra, to Secretary of State, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/9-247, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 2, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD) ("Despite secrecy of Yalta [A]greement it looks as though it must be
accepted."); Memorandum of Conversation, British Commonwealth Conference on Japanese Treaty, State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 11, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD) ("The Canberra Conference agreed that the [territorial] provisions of
Cairo, Potsdam and Yalta would have to be confirmed in the treaty."). See also Australian Legation at Rio
de Janeiro, Copy of a Telegram received from Department of External Affairs, Canberra, by Australian
Minister at Rio de Janeiro at 13:00 on September 2, 1947, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW
(PEACE)/9-347, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 3, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
167 Memorandum from Arthur R. Ringwalt, U.S. Embassy in London, United States Department of
State, to Noel Hemmendinger, Acting Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, United States
Department of State, State Dep't Decimal File No. 661.94/8-2856, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59
(Oct. 28, 1956) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
16s Telegram, Guidance on Northern Islands, State Dep't File No. Pol 19 Kuril Is; XR Pol 19 Ryu Is;
Tokyo 3312, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Apr. 3, 1972) (on file with the U.S. National Archives
and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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Affairs, and Mr. Nishimura, Chief of the Treaty Bureau of the Foreign
Office, replied to questions from Democratic Liberal Mr. Morio Sasaki and
Socialist Madam Satoko Toganai as to whether it was permitted to interpret
the Yalta Agreement as not binding on Japan. Their response was in
substance as follows:
It is natural that Japan should accept Potsdam and Cairo
Declarations at the peace conference, "We agree with you that
Japan will not be bounded by the Yalta Agreement, which is a
secret agreement from the viewpoint of international law."
Under terms of the Cairo Declaration, the question of the
territorial rights to the islands around the Japanese mainland
will be settled at the peace conference .... 169
Mr. Hisao Shimazu, Chief of the Political Affairs Bureau of the
Foreign Office, also told the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of
Representatives, in answer to a question asked by Democratic Liberal Mr.
Morio Sasaki, that the Yalta Agreement did not make it clear just what
islands were included in the Kurile Islands, nor was there any means to
clarify it. He further added that it was up to the Allied Powers to define
what the Kurile Islands were.170
Japan further argues that, in any case, it is not bound by the terms of
the Yalta Agreement, since Japan was not a party thereto and the Yalta
Agreement was not mentioned in the Potsdam Proclamation, which Japan
did accept. In addition, the Yalta Agreement could not have been the
determination referred to in paragraph 8 of the Potsdam Proclamation, since
it was concluded after the Potsdam Proclamation.'
It is also, however, difficult to totally disregard the legal weight of the
Yalta Agreement, since the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty took
this instrument into consideration throughout the drafting process. For
example, it was stated that the paper on the disposition of the Kurile Islands,
which was the basic source for deciding the disposition of the Kurile Islands
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty, had been revised in accordance with the
169 Japan May Claim Territorial Rights to South Kuriles, Bonins, Okinawas & lojima, State Gov't
Spokesmen, NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, Dec. 22, 1949 (on file with author).
170 Kurile Islands Said Indefinable, JIJI PRESS, Feb. 1, 1950 (on file with author).
171 Outgoing Telegram from John F. Dulles, supra note 86.
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Yalta Agreement. 172 At a meeting between Mr. Matsumoto and Mr. Malik
in London concerning the normalization of relations between Russia and
Japan, Mr. Malik made the following statement on the territorial issues:
Whatever Yoshida had pleaded for at [the] San Francisco
Conference of 1951, he actually signed [the] instrument
stipulating renunciation by Japan of its title to ... [the] Kuriles.
We know that some parties to [the] Yalta Agreement now
entertain doubt as to validity of agreement. From legal
standpoint, however, such doubt is of no value. In
conclusion, .... [the] Kuriles have legitimately been delivered
to [the] U.S.S.R. by [the] terms of [the] Potsdam Proclamation
and [the] Yalta Agreement. 173
In other words, the San Francisco Peace Treaty appears to be an
implementation of the precise terms of the Potsdam Proclamation and the
Yalta Agreement, both of which left the question of Japanese territorial
determination, over the Kurile Islands in particular, for subsequent
consideration, rather than attempting to carry out the vague provision of the
Cairo Declaration regarding territories taken by violence and greed.
In principle, the San Francisco Peace Treaty superseded all the
instruments previously made among the Allied Powers concerning Japan,
including the Potsdam Proclamation. Vis-i-vis the United States and the
other Allied Powers which signed and brought into force the San Francisco
172 Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Consideration, Disposition of the Ryukyu
(Liuchiu) Islands; Disposition of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands, State Dep't Records, Record
Group 59 (Feb. 12, 1946) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD).
173 Incoming Telegram from John M. Allison, U.S. Ambassador to Japan, State Dep't Decimal File
No. 661.941/6-3055, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (June 30, 1955) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD). Furthermore, concerning statements by the
Democratic Party as to the territorial provisions of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Prime Minister Yoshida
said, "They should be reminded Japan surrendered unconditionally. I think they'd better study Yalta
Agreement." Incoming Telegram from William J. Sebald, U.S. Political Advisor for Japan, State Dep't
Decimal File No. 694.001/11-650 GB, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 6 1950) (on file with
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD). The Soviet Union requested
an interpretation of the proposal of the United States concerning the Kurile Islands, in the light of the Cairo
Declaration and the Yalta Agreement. With regard to the Yalta Agreement, the U.S. Government remained
consistently of the opinion that its territorial provisions would need to be implemented in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty. Draft Reply to Soviet Aide-Memoire of November 20, 1950 on Japanese Peace Treaty, State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Dec. 19, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
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Peace Treaty, Japan renounced all claims to the Kurile Islands and had no
power to affect sovereignty over them. Therefore, if there is any
discrepancy between the Potsdam Proclamation and the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, the latter would prevail.
On the other hand, Japan and the Allied Powers that signed Japan's
Instrument of Surrender, but did not participate in the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, such as Russia, continued to be reciprocally bound by the terms of
the Instrument of Surrender. Thus, because the Instrument of Surrender
remained in force as between Japan and Allied Powers not participating in
the San Francisco Peace Treaty, 17 4 the relationship between them and Japan
did not revert to the status prior to Japan's surrender. As the formal state of
war continues, however, they may assert their right to continue the
occupation on the contention that the terms of the Instrument of Surrender
have not been or are not being carried out.
In that sense, Japan's only legal obligation vis-ei-vis the Soviet Union
after April 28, 1955,175 was to abide by the terms of the Instrument of
Surrender, which incorporated the Potsdam Proclamation.176 In turn, the
Potsdam Proclamation incorporated the statement issued at the Cairo
Conference, which provided that Japan should be expelled from all other
territories which she had taken by violence and greed. Japan argues that it
did not obtain the Kurile Islands by violence and greed but by peaceful
means confirmed by international agreement, and further claims that the
Kurile Islands did not become Japanese territory through the Treaty of
Shimoda and the subsequent treaties, but only were confirmed by them. If
the above arguments are tenable, the position could be taken that Japan is
174 This problem had assumed special importance in Japan in connection with the obligation
undertaken by the Allied Powers to return to Japan prisoners of war in their custody and the failure of the
Soviet Union to repatriate several hundred thousand Japanese soldiers taken prisoner by Soviet forces.
Therefore, for instance, the promise given in the Potsdam Declaration that the Japanese Military Forces
would be permitted to return to their homes remained in force so far as the relation between Japan and the
Soviet Union is concerned. On the other hand, it follows that Japan continued to be bound by the terms of
that Instrument vis-A-vis non-participating powers. Niles W. Bond, Acting Counselor of Mission in Japan,
Foreign Service Dispatch from U.S. Political Advisor, Tokyo, Japanese Interpretation of Certain Legal
Problems Raised by a Majority Peace Settlement, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/8-251, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 2, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
175 The date of the entry into force of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. See San Francisco Peace
Treaty, 3 U.S.T. 3169, 136 U.N.T.S. 45, supra note 12.
176 Japan's Instrument of Surrender, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 2, 1945),
http://www.nara.gov/exhall/wwii/surrender/surrender.html; Potsdam Proclamation, supra note 118, para. 8,
3 Bevans 1205.
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not required, vis-ei-vis the Soviet Union, to act as if it had renounced its
claim to the Kurile Islands.
Therefore, it can be said that the implications of the wartime
resolutions, made at Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam, as to the territorial
dispositions over the Kurile Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty are
significant. 177
B. Interpretation of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers'
Instructions
The General Headquarters of the Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers gave an instruction No. 677 entitled "Governmental and
Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan" on
January 29, 1946,178 which stated, "The Imperial Japanese Government is
directed to cease exercising, or attempting to exercise, governmental or
administrative authority over any area outside of Japan, or over any
government officials and employees or any other persons within such
areas." 179 It further stated, "For the purpose of this directive, Japan is
defined to include the four main islands of Japan (Hokkaido, Honshu,
Kyushu and Shikoku) and the approximately 1000 smaller adjacent
islands ... and excluding ... (c) the Kurile (Chishima) Islands, the Habomai
(Hapomaze) Island Group (including Suisho, Yuri, Aki-yuri, Shibotsu and
Taraku Islands) and Shikotan Island."' 80
This instruction has been considered one of the significant legal
instruments deciding the destiny of the Kurile Islands especially favoring
Russia. Russia continuously maintains that SCAPIN No. 677 decreed the
cessation of Japanese administration over various non-adjacent territories,
including the Kurile Islands, and this is a strong indication of what the
Allied Powers desired. In response to this Russian claim, Japan argues that
177 See discussion infra Part 11.
17S SCAPIN No. 677, supra note 79. There were other relevant instructions, such as SCAPIN No.
677/1: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan (Dec. 5, 1951);
SCAPIN No. 841: Governmental and Administrative Separation of Certain Outlying Areas from Japan
(Mar. 22, 1946); SCAPIN No. 1033: Area Authorized for Japanese Fishing and Whaling (June 22, 1946);
SCAPIN No. 1033/1: Area Authorized for Japanese Fishing and Whaling (Dec. 23, 1948); SCAPIN No.
1033/2: Japanese Fishery Inspection System, June 30, 1949. See S SCAP File, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD).
'79 SCAPIN No. 677, supra note 79, art. 1.
15' Id. art. 3.
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SCAPIN No. 677 suspended only Japanese administration of various island
areas, including the Kurile Islands, and it did not preclude Japan from
exercising sovereignty over this area permanently.
The United States recognized that the question of international
sovereignty was outside SCAP's authority. As SCAPIN No. 677 itself
stated, "Nothing in this directive shall be construed as an indication of
Allied policy relating to the ultimate determination of the minor islands
referred to in Article 8 of the Potsdam Declaration."'' 81 The United States
also pointed out that in all SCAPINs to the Japanese Government regarding
authorization of areas for Japanese fishing and whaling which were
established under SCAP, there appeared a statement providing essentially
that "the present authorization is not an expression of Allied policy relative
to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or
fishing rights in the area concerned or in any other area."' 82 Therefore, it
was the U.S. position that SCAPIN No. 677 was an operational directive to
the Japanese Government tentative in character and that specifically stated it
was not an Allied policy determination of Japanese territory. 183 In the same
vein, the SCAP General Order No. 1 merely stated that Japanese troops in
Sakhalin and the Kurile Archipelago should surrender to the Commander of
the Soviet Forces Far East, and it did not and was not intended to touch upon
the final disposition of these islands.'
84
There is also, however, a report, titled "Summaries of FEC Policy
Statements and Certain SCAP Directives to the Japanese Government, with
Proposals for Disposition in the Peace Settlement with Japan," regarding the
relationship between territorial questions and SCAPIN No. 677, which
"[d]efines present area of Japanese jurisdiction and provides a starting point
for decisions on details of territorial adjustments."'
' 85
SCAPIN No. 677 further stated, "For the purpose of this directive,
Japan is defined to include the four main islands of Japan . . . and the
approximately 1,000 smaller adjacent islands . . . and excluding
'8' Id. art. 6.
152 SCAPIN No. 1033, Area Authorized for Japanese Fishing and Whaling, art. 5, DC/S SCAP File
Room 600-I, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (June 22, 1946) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter SCAPIN No. 1033].
183 Outgoing Telegram from John F. Dulles, supra note 86.
184 id.
185 An Analysis of Far East Command Policy Statements and SCAP Directives Suggesting Their
Disposition in the Peace Settlement with Japan, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (1947) (on file with
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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Liancourt Rocks .. 86 This instruction is also considered one of the
significant legal instruments that could decide the destiny of the Liancourt
Rocks in favor of Korea. Korea continuously maintains that SCAPIN No.
677 decreed the cessation of Japanese administration over various non-
adjacent territories, including the Liancourt Rocks, and this is a strong
indication of what the Allied Powers desired to remove from Japanese
jurisdiction.' 87 In response to this Korean claim, Japan argues that SCAPIN
No. 677 suspended only Japanese administration of the various island areas,
including the Liancourt Rocks, and it did not preclude Japan from exercising
sovereignty over this area permanently, as the United States also opined in
the same vein.'
88
A later instruction, SCAPIN No. 1778 of September 16, 1947,
designated the islets as a bombing range for the Far East Air Force and
further provided that use of the range would be made only after notification
through Japanese civil authorities to the inhabitants of the Oki Islands and
certain ports on Western Honshu. 189  The action of the U.S.-Japan Joint
Committee in designating these rocks as a facility of the Japanese
Govemment is therefore justified according to Japanese interpretation. 190
Again, SCAPIN No. 677 did not purport to express Allied policy as to the
"ultimate determination of national jurisdiction, international boundaries or
fishing rights in the area concerned or in any other area."' 9' SCAPIN No.
116 Id. art. 3.
187 Incoming Telegram to Secretary of State from Muccio, U.S. Ambassador in Korea, State Dep't
Decimal File No. 694.95B/11-285 1, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 28, 1951) (on file with
the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD). ("YONHAP November 27
carries report from Tokyo correspondent that SCAP will punish members of Asahi party who sailed to
[Tokdo] without authorization, concludes this proves island not Japanese territory.").
'8s Letter from Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., Director of Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, to U.S.
Embassy in Korea, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 5, 1952) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Letter from Mr. Kenneth T.
Young, Jr.].
189 General Headquarters, SCAP, SCAPIN No. 1778, Memorandum for Japanese Government:
Liancourt Rocks Bombing Range, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 16, 1947) (on file with the
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) ("I. The islands of Liancourt
Rocks (or Take Shima), located 370 15' north, 131' 50' east, are designated as a bombing range. 2. The
inhabitants of Oki-Retto (Oki-Gunto) and the inhabitants of all the ports on the west coast of the island of
Honshu north to the 38th parallel, north latitude, will be notified prior to each actual use of this range.").
190 Id. ("This information will be disseminated through Military Government units to local Japanese
civil authorities.").
"9 SCAPIN No. 1033, supra note 182, art. 5. See also Letter to Mr. E. Allan Lightner, Jr., Charge
d'Affaires, ad interim in US Embassy in Korea, from Lt. Gen. Doyle 0. Hickey, General Staff, Chief of
Staff, Headquarters of the Far East Command (Nov. 27, 1952) (on file with author). For the skeptical U.S.
response against Korean claims, see Use of Disputed Territory (Tokto Island) as Live Bombing Area, State
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1033 of June 22, 1946, also provided that "3(b) Japanese vessels or
personnel thereof will not approach closer than twelve (12) miles to
Takeshima (370 15' North Latitude, 131' 53' East Longitude) nor have any
contact with said island .... The present authorization is not an expression
of allied policy relative to ultimate determination of national jurisdiction,
international boundaries or fishing rights in the area concerned or in any
other area."'
192
C. Draft Clauses Concerning the Disposition of the Kurile Islands
[Mr. Hugh Borton] 19 3 put the question of defining the Kuriles
before the committee. On a map it was pointed out that there
was a definite break between the northern and southern islands.
In considering the question of definition the committee divided
equally. Therefore Mr. Borton declared that the committee as a
group could reach no decision. [Mr. John K. Emerson] 194
suggested a possible compromise: the northern and central
islands should go back to Russia with no strings attached; the
southern if covered by the Yalta agreement should go back to
Russia; if there was any doubt about the disposition of the
southern islands, they should be retained by Japan (emphasis
added).'95
The territorial disposition of the Kurile Islands was addressed in the
San Francisco Peace Treaty. Article 2(c), as mentioned earlier, provided
that "Japan renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to
that portion of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan
acquired sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of
September 5, 1905." 196 Since the San Francisco Peace Treaty provides only
for a renunciation of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands without
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 15, 1952) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
192 SCAPIN No. 1033, supra note 182.
193 Hugh Borton was the Acting Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
194 John K. Emerson was a member of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs.
'9' Inter-Divisional Area Committee on the Far East, Consideration, Disposition of the Outlying and
Minor Japanese Islands, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Feb. 1, 1946) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
196 San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2(c), 3 U.S.T. 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 49.
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mentioning by name who should own them, a clarification of the meaning of
the legal disposition of these territories is required.
There is no agreed definition of what constitutes the Kurile Islands
acceptable to both claimants. The word "Kuriles" is a Russian word,
meaning smoky or volcanic area. 197 The determination of whether Etorofu,
Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais are part of the Kurile Archipelago or
part of Hokkaido is critical. Since Japan, by the terms of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, renounced all claims to the "Kurile Islands," and since the
term "Kurile Islands" was not precisely defined by the treaty itself, Japan
can move to exclude Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais from
the Kurile Archipelago and claim that these islands are separate entities from
the eighteen islands in the Kurile Archipelago. For the Japanese, the Kurile
Archipelago was known as "Chishima Retto," which means "Thousand
Islands Archipelago," starting from Shimushu, the northernmost island, to
Uruppu, the southernmost island.' 98 For that purpose, Japan cites the Treaty
of St. Petersburg as proof; since only eighteen islands were enumerated in
Article II of the Treaty of St. Petersburg, Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and
the Habomais do not belong to the Kurile Archipelago.' 99
The current official Japanese view on the Kurile Archipelago, that
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais are not included in the
terminology of "Kuriles," has been articulated since 1956. On February 11,
1956, Mr. Morishita, the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, replied to the
House of Representatives of the Japanese Parliament that the term "Kurile
Islands" in the San Francisco Peace Treaty did not include Kunashiri and
Etorofu, 20 and therefore, neither Shikotan nor the Habomais were included.
The Japanese do not generally consider Shikotan and the Habomais part of
Kurile Archipelago, but part of Hokkaido.
197 Memorandum, B-29 Study and Japanese Claims to the Southern Kuriles and Habomais, supra
note 67.
:98 BERTON, supra note 32, at 8-9.
99 Id. at 21-22.
200 Answer by Japanese Deputy Foreign Minister Morishita (Feb. 11, 1956), reprinted in ALLISON,
supra note 35, at 130. See also Airgram from the U.S. Dep't of State to U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, Kunashiri
and Etorofu Islands, State Dep't File No. SCI 25 Japan; Pol 32-6 Japan-USSR, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (Aug. 28, 1964) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD). ("The [U.S. Department of State] is willing to comply with the Japanese Government's
request that the United States refrain from using the term "Southern Kuriles" when referring to Kunashiri
and Etorofu in the future .... [It] should be recognized that the Japanese Government has frequently
referred to these islands as the "Southern Kuriles." Furthermore, Etorofu and Kunashiri were included as
part of the Kuriles chain on all pre-war maps.").
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Meanwhile, Russia claims that not only Kunashiri and Etorofu, but
also Shikotan and the Habomais are part of the Kurile Islands. In contrast
with the Japanese, the Russians refer to the Kurile Archipelago as the "Great
Kuriles," and, in particular, to Shikotan together with the Habomais as the
"Little Kuriles" (or "Lesser Kuriles"). 20 1 Russia also refers to the term
"Southern Kuriles" as a single entity to include the currently disputed Kurile
Islands-Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais. 20 2 Russia has
rejected efforts to treat the "Southern Kuriles" as separate from the main
Kurile Archipelago on the grounds that Japanese historical and geographical
literature treated the Kurile Islands as one unit for nearly three centuries.2 °3
To define the term "Kurile Islands" as renounced by Japan in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty is also very important in the sense that it is highly
likely that in any future negotiations between Russia and Japan over the
Kurile Islands, the Japanese will not seek in their discussions with the
Russians to repudiate the renunciation of interest in the "Kurile Islands,"
which is contained in the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Rather, it is likely
that they will seek to define their renunciation as being limited to those
islands in the Kurile Archipelago formerly owned by the Russians, which
would exclude Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais.
Inasmuch as usage in this remote area was extremely vague, it may be
difficult to produce a mutually acceptable interpretation. Since the question
is what Japan intended to relinquish by the words "Kurile Islands" in the San
Francisco Peace Treaty, Japanese usage and administrative history, as well
as the Japanese cultural and economic history in this area is of great
importance, coupled with evidence produced by Russia, and certain
geological and geographical aspects. To further clarify the term "Kurile
Islands," this article divides them into two groups: Etorofu and Kunashiri,
and Shikotan and the Habomais.
Since the San Francisco Peace Treaty provides only for renunciation
of Japanese sovereignty over the Kurile Islands, without naming those who
should own them, a clarification of the effect of the legal disposition of these
territories is required. Thus, each draft of the territorial clauses of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty will be examined for that purpose.
201 BERTON, supra note 32, at 8.
202 Airgram, Northern Territories' Issues, supra note 72.
203 Id.
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1. Draft Dated March 19, 194 7204
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the first draft of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty provided, "The territorial limits of Japan shall be
those existing on January 1, 1894, subject to the modifications set forth in
Articles 2, 3.... As such these limits shall include the four principal islands
of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all minor offshore islands,
excluding the Kurile Islands. ... Japan ... cedes to the Soviet Union in full
sovereignty the Kurile Islands, lying between Kamchatka and Hokkaido.
'
,
20 5
Thus, the draft dated March 19, 1947, concluded that the currently
disputed Kurile Islands were to be handed over to the Soviet Union. This is
the outcome of U.S. commitment in the Yalta Agreement to hand over the
Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union,20 6 and also a reflection of U.S. policy and
security considerations such as weighing the vital strategic importance of the
specific territories.20 7
There was, however, a memorandum recommending that the Kurile
Islands should be retained by Japan, or alternatively divided and retained by
Japan through the various modules, such as: Etorofu and Kunashiri, together
with Shikotan and the small islands between the latter and the easternmost
cape of Hokkaido; or, if that was not feasible, Kunashiri, with Shikotan and
the minor islands between the latter and Hokkaido. °8 This memorandum
further clarified the reason for the suggestion: The United States favored the
Etorofu Strait between Etorofu and Uruppu and the Kunashiri Channel
between Kunashiri and Etorofu as good lines of separation between Japanese
and Russian territories, since the former is a deep, unobstructed strait, with
the smallest width being about twenty-two nautical miles, and the latter is
twelve nautical miles wide and is also clear of dangers. 20' This
memorandum also recommended the retention of the Kurile Islands by Japan
on the following grounds: to Japan these islands were the home of resident
204 The text of this draft is reproduced in Memorandum to General MacArthur, supra note 13.
205 Memorandum to General MacArthur, supra note 13, ch. I, arts. 1, 3(2).
206 Consideration, Disposition of Southern Sakhalin and the Kurile Islands; Disposition of the
Outlying and Minor Japanese Islands, supra note 82.
207 Id. The United Kingdom's object was also to see that whatever arrangements were made provided
adequately for the defense of the British Commonwealth territories elsewhere in the Far East and the
Pacific, including especially Australia and New Zealand. See Memorandum of Conversation, Canberra
Conference on Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 2.
208 Disposition of the Kuriles in the Treaty with Japan, supra note 103.
209 Id.
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210Japanese, and the area was important for fishing, given that about one-
ninth of Japan's fishing products were said to have come from the Kurile
Islands and the vicinity of Nemuro on Hokkaido. The views expressed in
this memorandum are reflected in subsequent drafts.
2. Draft Dated August 5, 1947211
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated August 5,
1947, provided, "The territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four
principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and
all minor islands, including . . . the Habomai Islands, Shikotan, Kunashiri
and Etorofu. . . . Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands, comprising the islands
northeast of Etorofu Strait (Etorofu Kaikyo) from Urup (Uruppu) to
Shumushu inclusive, which were ceded by Russia to Japan by the Treaty of
1875."212
Consequently, this draft concluded that the currently disputed Kurile
Islands should be retained by Japan. This is largely based on the fact that
the United States newly interpreted the Yalta Agreement's reference to the
term "Kurile Islands" as not including the currently disputed islands, in
particular Etorofu and Kunashiri. The United States adjudged that
ethnically, economically, and historically these islands have always been
part of Japan.213
2"o Id. This memorandum also reported that the permanent population of the whole Kurile
Archipelago (approximately 18,000 in 1940) is almost entirely Japanese. About 90 percent live in the
southernmost islands: Kunashiri 9,000 in Kunashiri, 5,100 in Etorofu, 1,500 in Shikotan, and perhaps
another 500 on the Habomais. This memorandum also mentioned the United States' interests over the
Kurile Islands, because of their nearness to the principal sea route to Japan, and to the Aleutian Islands. Id.
21 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum from Hugh Borton, supra note 14.
212 Memorandum from Hugh Borton, supra note 14, ch. I, arts. 1(1), 3(2).
213 U.S. Dep't of State, Working Group on Japan Treaty, Notes of Meeting on Friday, August 1,
1947, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 1, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD); George F. Kennan, Results of Planning Staff Study of
Questions Involved in the Japanese Peace Settlement, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW
(PEACE)/10-2447, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 14, 1947) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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3. Draft Dated January 8, 1948214
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated January
8, 1948, provided that "Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands." 2t 5 This draft did not
specify which of the Kurile Islands Japan should cede to the Soviet Union.
This draft mentioned the sources for the territorial clauses, which were based
largely on international agreements made at Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam, and
further mentioned the Yalta Agreement as the sole source for the disposition
of the Kurile Islands, in particular.21 6 The draft also acknowledged that the
main outstanding problems in the territorial clauses concerned the Kurile
Islands and the Ryukyus. In addition, in reference to the Kurile Islands,
since they were not defined in the Yalta Agreement, the United States was to
reach a definitive decision on the disposition of the Kurile Islands. 27 It
further noted that if the United States proposed a narrow interpretation of the
"Kurile Islands," the southernmost islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan,
and the Habomais would be retained by Japan.218
4. Draft Dated October 13, 1949219
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated October
13, 1949, provided: "The territorial limits of Japan shall comprise the four
principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and
all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of ... Etorofu, Kunashiri,
the Habomai Islands, Shikotan. . . . Japan hereby cedes to the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands., 220 The
drafters adopted a narrow interpretation of the "Kurile Islands," and clarified
that the southernmost islands of Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the
Habomais would be retained by Japan. The accompanying Note I of this
draft also envisaged the possibility that the Soviet Union would not sign the
San Francisco Peace Treaty. In that situation, this Note mentioned that "it
214 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum, Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra
note 15.
25 Id. art. 3(2).
216 Memorandum, Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 15.
217 Id.
218 id.
219 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum, Attached Treaty Draft, supra note 16.
220 Memorandum, Attached Treaty Draft, supra note 16, ch. I, arts. 1(1), 3(2).
VOL. I I No. I
SAN FRANCISCO PEA CE TREA TY
would be the U.S. position that the treaty should not contain a provision
whereby Japan would cede the territories described in Article 3, but that it
should provide that the status of these territories should be determined
subsequently by the states concerned, including the parties to the present
Treaty.",
221
As to the territorial questions of the draft, a report titled "Interests and
Attitudes of F.E.C. Powers on Questions relating to the Peace Settlement
with Japan" by the U.S. Department of State summarized the response of the
individual countries to the issue of the Kurile Islands in particular. The
report raised the question as to the disposition of the Kurile Islands, stating
that "[an] attempt by the US to assign to Japan ... the Kuril Islands . . . will
undoubtedly appear to some powers as an attempt to violate the Yalta
agreement at the expense of the USSR and in favor of Japan.... ,222
5. Draft Dated November 2, 1949223
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated on
November 2, 1949, provided:
The territory of Japan shall comprise the four principal
Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido
and all adjacent minor islands, including ...all other islands
within a line beginning at a point in 450 45' N. latitude, 1400
longitude east of Greenwich, proceeding due east through La
Perouse Strait (Soya Kaikyo) to 1460 E. longitude; thence by a
rhumb line in a direction to the west of south to a point in 430
45' N. latitude, 1450 20' E. longitude; thence by a rhumb line in
a southeasterly direction to a point in 430 20' N. latitude, 1460
221 Id. ch. I, art. 3, n.I.
222 Interests and Attitudes of Far East Command Powers on Questions relating to the Peace
Settlement with Japan, supra note 58. For the report on the position of individual states, i.e., Australia, see
Office of Intelligence Research, Division of Research for Europe, OIR Report No. 4485.2; for China,
Office of Intelligence Research, Division of Research for Far East, OIR Report No. 4485.4; for India,
USDOS, Office of Intelligence Research, Division of Research for Near East and Africa, OIR Report No.
4485.6; and for the Soviet Union, Office of Intelligence Research, Division of Research for Europe, OIR
Report No. 4485.10, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
223 This draft is excerpted in Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 17.
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E. longitude; thence due east to a point in 149' E. longitude;
thence due south to 370 N. latitude. 2 4
It further provided that "Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands., 225 Again, in this
draft, Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais, the currently
disputed Kurile Islands, were to be excluded from Japanese territory and
ceded to the Soviet Union.
Accompanying Note I to Article 5 is identical to Note I to Article 3 in
the draft dated October 13, 1949.226 Note II to Article 5 stated that the
decision whether the United States would propose the retention by Japan of
Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and the Habomais had not been made. 227 The
Note also acknowledged the difficult position of the United States,
considering its relationship with Japan. It suggested that it might be
advisable for the United States to propose that the Soviet Union place the
Kurile Islands under the trusteeship system.228
The territorial dispositions of the Kurile Islands as set out in this draft,
however, brought about many repercussions within the U.S. Department of
State. These resulted in a different provision, as shown below, in subsequent
drafts. In that sense, intemal memoranda by William J. Sebald, the U.S.
Political Advisor for Japan, should be noted, considering their important and
influential nature. His comments concerning Article 5(2) were: Japan
unquestionably advanced a strong claim to Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, and
the Habomais; the United States should support that claim and make due
allowance in drafts for peculiarities in this case; and the United States
considered this issue highly important in view of questions regarding
permanent boundaries and fisheries.229 His other comments on a draft dated
November 2, 1949, with regard to the disposition of the Kurile Islands were
as follows:
224 Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 17, ch II, art. 3(1).
225 Id. art. 5(2).
226 Both notes contemplate the U.S. course of action in case the Soviet Union does not sign the treaty.
See id. ch. II, art 5 n.I; see also supra note 221 and accompanying text.
227 Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 17, ch. II, art 5 n.11.
228 Id.
229 Incoming Telegram from William J. Sebald to Secretary of State, State Dep't Decimal File No.
740.0011 PW (PEACE)/I 1-1449, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 14, 1949) (on file with the
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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[It] is suggested that the draft to be supplied to the United
Kingdom and British Commonwealths by the United States
contain a provision for the "ceding to the Soviet Union in full
sovereignty of the Kuril Islands, being those islands eastward
and northeastward from the mid-channel line between Etorofu
Island and Uruppu Island," and that this be accompanied by a
footnote to the effect that "It is the hope of the United States
that the Soviet Union will not seek to annex Etorofu, Kunashiri,
Shikotan, or Habomai Islands. The claim of their forming a
part of the Kuril Islands is historically weak, and they are of far
greater navigational and fishing importance to Japan than to any
other possessor." Concordantly with this expression, the
islands listed in our proposed Article 3 as belonging to Japan
would include specifically Etorofu, Kunashiri, Shikotan, or
Habomai Islands.
6. Draft Dated December 8, 1949231
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated
December 8, 1949 provided, "The territory of Japan shall comprise the four
principal Japanese home islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido
and all adjacent minor islands, including . . . the southern Kuril Islands
(Chishima) northeastward to and including Etorofu and including Shikotan
and the Habomai group....
This draft was largely influenced by the suggestion of William
Sebald, as the accompanying memorandum referred to "a revision of Article
3 'in positive terms' as proposed by William Sebald.- 233 It is also noted,
however, that the drafter questioned the desirability of this revision due to its
problematic nature, in particular the existence of disagreement about the fact
that William Sebald intimated the possibility of the Soviet Union's
234
concession of the Kurile Islands to Japan.
230 Comment on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 7.
231 This draft is excerpted in Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses, supra note 18.
232 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses, supra note 18, ch. II, art. 3.
233 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses, supra note 18.
234 Id.
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7. Draft Dated December 19, 1949235
The draft dated December 19, 1949, was named "Agreement
Respecting the Disposition of Former Japanese Territories on December 19,
1949." The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in this draft provided,
"The Allied and Associated Powers agree that the island of Sakhalin
(Karafuto) south of 50' N. latitude, and adjacent islands, including . . . the
Kurile Islands shall be transferred to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
in full sovereignty., 236 This provision stated that the Kurile Islands should
be transferred to the Soviet Union, but it failed to clarify the definition of the
Kurile Islands.
8. Drafts Dated December 29, 1949,237 and January 3, 1950 238
The territorial clauses on the Kurile Islands in the drafts dated
December 29, 1949, and January 3, 1950, provided: "The territory of Japan
shall comprise the four principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu,
Shikoku and Hokkaido and all adjacent minor islands, including . . . the
Habomai group and Shikotan.... Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands., 239 Two groups
influenced the territorial disposition of the Kurile Islands in these drafts.
One group advocated recognizing Etorofu and Kunashiri as the Kurile
Islands, thus requiring their cession to the Soviet Union; while the other
supported inclusion of Shikotan and the Habomais as Japanese territory.
This revision was based on the memorandum of December 8, 1949.240
The accompanying commentary to the draft dated December 29,
1949, stated that an earlier draft's proposal, in which post-treaty Japan was
circumscribed by a continuous line, described in Article 3 and drawn on the
map accompanying the treaty, was eliminated at the suggestion of Mr.
Sebald, the U.S. Political Advisor for Japan, who believed that a figurative
fencing about of Japan was psychologically undesirable. 241 This
235 Agreement respecting the Disposition of Former Japanese Territories, supra note 19.
236 Id. art. 2.
237 This draft is excerpted in Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
23' This draft is excerpted in Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 21.
239 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62, ch. II, art. 3(1); Draft Treaty of
Peace with Japan, supra note 21, ch. II, art. 3.
240 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 21.
241 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
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commentary also noted that Mr. Sebald further suggested that, to spare Japan
having or renounce by name a long list of former territories and territorial
claims, the chapter should be reduced to two simple articles. The first article
would list the territories Japan was to retain. In the second article, Japan
would renounce all its other territories and territorial claims to the Allied and
Associated Powers for disposition under a separate agreement among
themselves. The renounced territories would not be mentioned by name.
This proposal was rejected after careful consideration. The drafters
feared that if the Soviet Union and China did not sign the treaty or a separate
agreement, the final disposition of Formosa, Southern Sakhalin and the
Kurile Islands would be postponed, and the rights of the United States and
its Allies in the final disposition of these territories would be weaker as a
result of the territories' detachment from Japan than if they had been left
under Japanese sovereignty. With Japan's title extinguished, the Soviet
Union and China might claim that their former titles had been automatically
re-established. The drafters also thought that the United States might find it
difficult to justify such a proposal to the Allies, with the only reason for the
proposal being to spare Japanese sensibilities.242
9. Drafts Dated August 7, 1950,243 and September 11, 195044
The territorial clauses on the Kurile Islands in the drafts dated August
7, 1950 and September 11, 1950 provided:
Japan accepts whatever decision may hereafter be agreed upon
by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union
and China with reference to the future status of ... the Kurile
Islands. In the event of failure in any case to agree within one
year, the parties of this treaty will accept the decision of the
United Nations General Assembly.
245
242 Id.
243 Japanese Treaty, supra note 22.
244 Memorandum to Dean G. Acheson, supra note 23.
245 Japanese Treaty, supra note 22, ch. IV, 5. The draft dated September 11, 1950, provided:
Japan accepts whatever decision may hereafter be agreed upon by the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, China, and the United States with reference to the future status of ... the Kurile
Islands. In the event of failure in any case to agree within one year from the effective date of
this treaty, the parties to this Treaty will seek and accept the recommendation of the United
Nations General Assembly.
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This draft was created as a possible alternative to the long form
previously drafted, on the theory that circumstances may make it desirable to
expeditiously establish peace with Japan on the basis of a simple treaty.246
This provision stated Japanese acceptance of the territorial disposition over
the Kurile Islands, but failed to clarify the meaning of "the Kurile Islands".
10. Drafts Dated March 12, 1951,247 and March 17, 1951248
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated March
12, 1951, provided: "Japan will return to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the islands adjacent to
it and will hand over to the Soviet Union the Kurile Islands, as they may be
defined by bilateral agreement or by judicial decision....
This provision manifested the cession of the Kurile Islands to the
Soviet Union, but it did not clarify what was included in the definition of the
Kurile Islands.2 5 0 This draft closely followed the approach of the draft of
September 11, 1950. 251 The drafters also envisaged an alternative
mechanism to resolve the issue of territorial disposition over the Kurile
Islands by suggesting that the Kurile Islands may be defined by bilateral
agreement or by judicial decision. The drafters would provide the Soviet
Union no benefits unless it accepted the treaty, and if it was apparent in
advance that the Soviet Union would definitely not sign the treaty, the
drafters would be further prepared to reconsider whether reference to the
Kurile Islands should be totally eliminated from the treaty. 52
This idea of an alternative mechanism was deleted in the draft dated
March 17, 1951,253 which provided that "Japan will return to the Union of
Memorandum to Dean G. Acheson, supra note 23, ch. IV. 5.
246 Japanese Treaty, supra note 22.
247 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum from John F. Dulles, supra note 24.
248 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum, supra note 25.
249 Memorandum from John F. Dulles, supra note 24, ch. 111 5.250 See Memorandum from John F. Dulles, supra note 24.
251 See Memorandum to Dean G. Acheson, supra note 23.
252 Outgoing Telegram from Dean G. Acheson, Secretary of State, to William J. Sebald, U.S. Political
Advisor for Japan, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/3-1451 CS/H, State Dep't Records, Record Group
59 (Mar. 14, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD). 252 Memorandum, supra note 25.
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Soviet Socialist Republics the southern part of Sakhalin as well as all the
islands adjacent to it and will hand over to the Soviet Union the Kurile
Islands."
254
11. Draft Dated April 7, 1951255
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated April 7,
1951, provided:
Japanese sovereignty shall continue over all the islands and
adjacent islets and rocks lying within an area bounded by a line
. . . in a south-easterly direction parallel to the coast of
Hokkaido to 1450 30' E. entering Numero Kaikyo at
approximately 44' 30' N. in a south-westerly direction to
approximately 430 45' N. and 1450 15' E., then in a south-
easterly direction to approximately 430 35' N. 1450 35' E., then
bearing north-easterly to approximately 440 N., so excluding
Kunashiri, and curving to the east and then bearing south-
westerly to include Shikotanat 1470 5'E .... 
256
It further stated: "Japan hereby cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics in full sovereignty the Kurile Islands, and that portion of South
Sakhalin over which Japan formerly exercised sovereignty." 257 Thus, as the
territorial disposition of the Kurile Islands in the previous drafts dated
December 29, 1949, and January 3, 1950, provided, this draft also counted
Etorofu and Kunashiri as part of the Kurile Islands to be ceded to the Soviet
Union, but Shikotan and the Habomais would be retained by Japan.
12. Draft Dated May 3, 1951258
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the draft dated May 3,
1951, provided: "Japan cedes to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics the
24 Id. ch. III 5.
255 This draft is excerpted in Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra
note 26.
256 Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra note 26, pt. I, art. 1.
257 Id. art. 3.
258 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, Revised May 3, 1951, supra note 27.
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Kurile Islands, and that portion of South Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to
it over which Japan formerly exercised sovereignty., 259 Except manifesting
Japanese cession of the Kurile Islands to the Soviet Union, this draft again
left open the question of the Kurile Islands' definition. This issue would be
further affected by the response of the individual countries to this draft,
expressed notably in a memorandum from Canada to the United States.
Canada suggested that Japan might merely renounce its title to the Kurile
Islands, rather than cede them to the Soviet Union, subject to the proviso
that the Soviet Union became a party to the treaty. 260 The United States
responded that this suggestion could, with advantage, be further considered
if and when the ultimate attitude of the Soviet Union toward the treaty was
made apparent.
26
'
This idea-that Japan would not cede the Kurile Islands specifically
to the Soviet Union, but would simply renounce its title to them-was
further pursued in the U.S. response to an inquiry from New Zealand. In
view of the need to ensure that none of the islands near Japan was left in
disputed sovereignty, New Zealand favored the idea of precise delimitation
by latitude and longitude of the territory to be retained by Japan. New
Zealand further suggested that the adoption of this device could make it
clear that Shikotan and the Habomais, then under Russian occupation, would
remain with Japan. 262 On the first point, the United States pointed out the
psychological disadvantages of seeming to fence Japan in by a continuous
line. On the second point, with regard to Shikotan and the Habomais, it
seemed to the United States more realistic, with the Soviet Union in
occupation of the islands, not to specifically stipulate their return to Japan.263
In sum, it must be strongly presumed that the United States preferred not to
clarify the definition of the Kurile Islands to be ceded, and further not to
specify the beneficiary of the ceded territory, beyond simply providing
renunciation of the Japanese title to them.
239 Id. ch. II, art. 4.
260 Reply Memorandum from John F. Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, to Hume Wrong,
Canadian Ambassador in the United States, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/5-151 CS/H, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (May 8, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
261 id.
262 Japanese Peace Treaty, Working Draft and Commentary, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/6-
151, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (June 1, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
263 Id.
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13. Drafts Dated June 14, 1951,264 July 3, 1951, 2"' and July 20, 1951266
The territorial clause on the Kurile Islands in the drafts dated June 14,
1951, July 3, 1951, and July 20, 1951, stated: "Japan renounces all right,
title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the
islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a
consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5, 1905.,,267 These
drafts had been prepared by the United States and the United Kingdom using
a previous draft by the United States that was circulated to the governments
of the countries most closely concerned with the war against Japan, a draft
independently prepared by the United Kingdom circulated at about the same
time to the British Commonwealth nations, and comments and observations
received from the governments concerned in relation to the two preceding
drafts.268 Thus, as mentioned earlier, these drafts would be the reflection of
the U.S. and other interested countries' stance, on the territorial disposition
of the Kurile Islands.
It was the U.S. view that Japan should be required to renounce its
rights to the Kurile Islands, but that disposition of these territories should not
be made by the treaty itself. The reason for leaving the disposition of the
Kurile Islands undetermined is that it was considered undesirable that the
Soviet Union should have its title to these territories cleared by a treaty that
it would almost certainly refuse to sign. 2 69 Thus, the U.S. view was that it
was better to leave the issue of what was a correct definition of the Kurile
264 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 28.
265 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 29.
266 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30.
267 See Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 28, ch. I, art. 2(c); Draft Japanese Peace Treaty,
supra note 29, ch. II, art. 2(c); Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, ch. II, art. 2(c).
268 See Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 28. The suggestion to simply renounce Japan's title
to the Kurile Islands without designating the recipient received wide support, in particular, from the United
Kingdom and France. For the response of the United Kingdom, see Check List of Positions Stated by the
U.S. and the U.K. at April 25-27 Meetings, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/4-2751, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Apr. 27, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Check List of Positions Stated by the U.S. and the U.K.]
For the response of France, see Ambassador David Bruce, U.S. Embassy in France, Conversations of John
Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary of State, with Foreign Office Officials Regarding Japanese Peace
Treaty, June 11, 1951, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/6-1451, State Dep't Records, Record Group
59 (June 14, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD) [hereinafter Conversations of John Foster Dulles].
69 Memorandum from Robert A. Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands,
the Habomais and Shikotan, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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Islands to subsequent arbitration or International Court of Justice decision
rather than to settle the issue in the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself,
particularly since the Russians were already in occupation of the disputed
Kurile Islands.
270
14. The Implications of Drafts on the Territorial Disposition of the Kurile
Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
The territorial clause of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, "Japan
renounces all right, title and claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion
of Sakhalin and the islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired
sovereignty as a consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of September 5,
1905, '271 can be interpreted as follows. (1) Various wartime resolutions, in
particular the Yalta Agreement, had significant legal weight for effecting
territorial dispositions of the Kurile Islands; (2) The Soviet Union was the
only recipient of the Kurile Islands envisaged by the Allied Powers; (3)
there were no agreed definitions of the "Kurile Islands" among the Allied
Powers, or even within the U.S. Department of State; (4) Fourth, due to the
significantly contradictory nature of the various drafts of the treaty, and
other relevant instruments, the question of what exactly constituted "the
Kurile Islands" remains unclear; (5) There are strong indications that the
Allied Powers preferred not to resolve the matter of the ultimate disposition
of the Kurile Islands in the San Francisco Peace Treaty and, instead, left it to
the future to resolve this issue through other international mechanisms.
D. Draft Clauses Regarding the Disposition of the Senkaku Islands
The United States Government is aware that a dispute exists
between the governments of the Republic of China and Japan
regarding the sovereignty of the Senkaku Islands. The United
States believes that a return of administrative rights over those
islands to Japan from which those rights were received can in
no way prejudice the underlying claims of the Republic of
China. The United States cannot add to the legal rights Japan
possessed before it transferred administration of the islands to
270 Conversations of John Foster Dulles, supra note 268.
271 San Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2(c), 3 U.S.T. 3172, 136 U.N.T.S. 49.
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the United States nor can the United States by giving back what
it received diminish the rights of the Republic of China
(emphasis added).272
The term "Senkaku Islands," or any Chinese or western name
corresponding to the name conventionally used, did not appear specifically
in the territorial clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty. Further, the
Senkaku Islands were not mentioned specifically in any international
agreement, and apparently were ignored internationally until the awakening
of interests in oil explorations of the continental shelf in 1968. However, the
drafts of the San Francisco Peace Treaty still shed some light on the issue.
As to the Senkaku Islands, the territorial provisions in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty can be categorized into two issues: one concerns the territorial
limits of Japan and territorial disposition of Taiwan; and the other, the U.N.
trusteeship over the Senkaku Islands.
1. Draft Clauses Limiting Japanese Territory
In the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the provision on the territorial
limits of Japan, which confined Japanese territory to the four principal
Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all minor
islands, was consistently maintained throughout the earlier drafts with slight
modifications. The provision, which expressly defined the territorial limits
of Japan was, however, discontinued. The pattern manifesting territorial
disposition of the specific territories that Japan should renounce was then
further emphasized.
The distinctive draft in the first category on the territorial limits of
Japan, which had certain implications on the territorial disposition over the
Senkaku Islands, is the first available draft of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty, dated March 19, 1947."' This draft provided:
272 Telegram, State Dep't File No. Pol 32-6 Senkaku Is, Taipei 2946, State Dep't Records, Record
Group 59 (June 17, 1971) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD); see also Senkakus Dispute, State Dep't File No. Pol 32-6 Senkaku Is 051921, State Dep't
Records, Record Group 59 (Mar. 27, 1972) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
273 Memorandum to General MacArthur, Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty, supra note
13.
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The territorial limits of Japan shall be those existing on January
1, 1894, subject to the modifications set forth in Articles 2,
3. . . . As such these limits shall include the four principal
islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido and all
minor offshore islands, excluding the Kurile Islands, but
including the Ryukyu Islands forming part of Kagoshima
Prefecture.274
As this draft stated that the "territorial limits of Japan shall be those
existing on January 1, 1894," and Japan did not claim the Senkaku Islands
until the Cabinet Decision of January 14, 1895, the drafters of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty did not envision Japan as the rightful owner of the
Senkaku Islands. Specific mention of the date "January 1, 1894," however,
did not appear in subsequent drafts. This clause further provided inclusion
of the Ryukyu Islands, forming part of Kagoshima Prefecture, rather than
Okinawa Prefecture, into Japanese territory.
2. Draft Clauses Defining Taiwan's Territorial Claims
Meanwhile, the drafts in the second category on the territorial
disposition of Taiwan had provided that "Japan renounces all right, title and
claim to Formosa and the Pescadores," with some modifications throughout
the drafts. The basic format among others appeared in the drafts dated
August 5, 1947, and January 8, 1948, which provided:
Japan hereby cedes to China in full sovereignty the island of
Taiwan (Formosa) and adjacent minor islands, including
Agincourt (Hoka Sho), Crag (Menka Sho), Pinnacle (Kahei
Sho), Samasana (Kasho To), Botel Tobago (Koto Sho), Little
Botel Tobago (Shokoto Sho), Vele Reti Rocks (Shichisei Seki),
and Lambay (Ryukyu Sho); together with the Pescadores
Islands (Hoko Shoto); and all other islands to which Japan had
acquired title within a line beginning at a point in 26' N.
latitude, 121' E. longitude and proceeding due east to 1220 30'
E. longitude, thence due south to 210 30' N. latitude, thence due
west through the Bashi Channel to 119' E. longitude, thence
274 Id. ch. 1, art. 1.
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due north to a point in 240 N. latitude, thence northeasterly to
the point of beginning.275
By mentioning the specific islands Japan should cede to China, and
delineating Taiwan through latitude and longitude, the drafters of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty did not include the Senkaku Islands within
Chinese/Taiwanese territory. In other words, putting aside the question
whether the drafters designated the Senkaku Islands as part of the Ryukyu
Islands, it is manifested that the Senkaku Islands were not envisioned as
Chinese/Taiwanese territory.
3. Draft Clauses Defining the Terms of the United Nations Trusteeship
In the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the provision on the Senkaku
Islands dealt more with the introduction of U.N. trusteeship over the islands
rather than with their territorial disposition. The first available draft of the
San Francisco Peace Treaty, dated March 19, 1947, provided that "Japan
hereby renounces all rights and titles to the Ryukyu Islands forming part of
Okinawa Prefecture, and to Daito and Rasa Islands. ' ' 276 By this draft, Japan
also renounced the Senkaku Islands, since the Senkaku Islands are part of
the Ryukyu Islands, in particular Okinawa Prefecture.
Japan's renunciation of the Ryukyu Islands south of 290 North
latitude, which are manifestly inclusive of the currently disputed Senkaku
Islands, was provided within the envisioned system of the U.N. trusteeship
in subsequent drafts, with some modifications. In particular, the drafts dated
October 13, 1949, and November 2, 1949, provided:
Japan hereby renounces all rights and titles to the Ryukyu
Islands south of 290 North latitude. The Allied and Associated
Powers undertake to support an application by the United States
for the placing of these islands under trusteeship, in association
with Articles 77, 79, and 85 of the Charter of the United
275 Memorandum from Hugh Borton, supra note 14, art. 2(1). For Article 2 in the draft dated January
8, 1948, see Memorandum, Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 15.276 Memorandum to General MacArthur, Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty, supra note
13, art. 7.
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Nations, the trusteeship agreement to provide that the United
States shall be the administering authority.
277
The draft dated December 8, 1949, provided:
Japan hereby cedes and renounces all territory and all mandate
and concession rights, titles and claims outside the territorial
area described in Article 3, and accepts the disposition of these
territories that has been made or that may be made by the
parties concerned, or by the United Nations in accordance with
the trusteeship provisions of Articles 77, 79, and 85 of the
Charter of the United Nations. 2
78
Article 3 was the provision confining Japanese territory to the four
principal Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido, and
all minor islands. The draft dated December 29, 1949, also provided for
Japanese renunciation of all rights and titles to the Ryukyu Islands south of
29' North latitude, and placed them within the U.N. trusteeship, with the
United States as the sole administering authority.
279
Subsequent drafts, from the one dated December 19, 1949, adopted a
similar format, which envisaged U.N. trusteeship with the United States as
the sole administering authority over the Ryukyu Islands south of 290 North
latitude, as appeared in Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.
However, the other key element of this provision, which specifically
provided that "Japan hereby renounces all rights and titles to the Ryukyu
Islands south of 290 N. latitude" was not mentioned in the December 19,
1949, draft and other subsequent drafts, except the draft dated December 29,
1949.
4. Appraisal
With regard to the Senkaku Islands, as defined in the San Francisco
Peace Treaty, the following points can be made: (1) As mentioned earlier,
the term "Senkaku Islands," or any Chinese or western name corresponding
277 Memorandum, Attached Treaty Draft, supra note 16, art. 6. See Commentary on Treaty of Peace
with Japan, supra note 17, Article 8 in the draft dates Nov. 2, 1949.
2 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 18, art. 4.
279 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62, art. 7.
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to the name conventionally used, did not appear specifically in the territorial
clauses of the San Francisco Peace Treaty; (2) The Senkaku Islands were not
included as either Chinese/Taiwanese or Japanese territory by the drafters of
the San Francisco Peace Treaty; (3) Article 3 of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty did not define the territories that were placed within the area of the
U.N. trusteeship with the United States as the sole administering authority,
due to the fact that the boundaries of the Ryukyu Islands had never been
legally defined before the treaty negotiations. Further, the precise
demarcation and delineation of the area of the Ryukyu Islands has also been
subject to disputes between claimants and interested parties; (4) Throughout
the drafts, in particular in the earlier drafts, there are strong presumptions
that Japan would renounce all rights and titles to the Ryukyu Islands south
of 29' North latitude, an area that includes the disputed Senkaku Islands.
E. Draft Treaty Clauses Concerning the Disposition of the Liancourt
Rocks
In the course of private talks on other matters, [U.S. Secretary
of State Dean Rusk] referred to the Korea-Japan negotiations,
and said that [the United States] hoped for an early
conclusion. . . . [President Chung-Hee Park of Korea] stated
that one of the irritating problems, although it was a small one,
in the negotiations was Tokto Island (Takeshima). These are
uninhabited rocks in the Sea of Japan that are claimed by both
Korea and Japan. Korean security forces actually guard them,
and the Koreans believe that they historically belong to Korea.
The Japanese believe they have a like claim. President Park said
he would like to bomb the island out of existence to resolve the
problem. Secretary Rusk . . . suggested that perhaps a joint
Korean-Japanese commanded light house be set up and the
problem of to whom it belonged left unanswered, letting it die a
natural death. President Park commented that a joint
lighthouse with Korea and Japan just would not work (emphasis
added).28 °
280 Memorandum of Conversation, Korea-Japan Negotiations, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59
(May 18, 1965) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
See also Memorandum from W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary to Secretary of State, Your Meeting
with Director Kim Jong Pil of the Korean CIA: Monday, October 29, 4:00 p.m., State Dep't Decimal File
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The terms of the territorial disposition regarding Korea followed the
terms of the Cairo Declaration of December 1, 1943, confirmed at Potsdam
on July 26, 1945, to the effect that "Japan will also be expelled from all
other territories which she has taken by violence and greed. The aforesaid
three great powers, mindful of the enslavement of the people of Korea, are
determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent., 281
It also declared that Quelpart Island, Port Hamilton, Dagelet (Utsuryo)
Island, and all the other offshore Korean islands were naturally to be
included in the new independent Korea, for they were historically and
administratively part of Korea and were inhabited primarily by Koreans.28 2
The Potsdam Proclamation in stating, "[t]he terms of the Cairo Declaration
shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall be limited to the islands
of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku, and such minor islands as we
determine,, 283 indicated that other minor Japanese islands may be detached
from Japan, at the discretion of the Allied Powers. As for the other areas, it
was stipulated only that Japan shall renounce right, title and claim to them,
and no reference was made as to their status following such renunciation.
Further, Japan accepted the terms of the Potsdam Proclamation.284
No. 694.95B/10-2762, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 27, 1962) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD); Memorandum of Conversation, State
Dep't Decimal File No. 694.95B/10-2962, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 29, 1962) (on file
with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) (concerning the
Liancourt Rocks, Director Jong-Pil Kim of the Korean CIA also suggested to the Japanese that it would be
blown up); Memorandum of Conversation, September 7, 1954: Japan-ROK Problems, State Dep't Decimal
File No. FW 694.95B/9-954, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 29, 1962) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) ("Couldn't the U.S. Air Force or
someone blow up the island and thus dispose of the problem once and for all?").
281 Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra note 26.
282 PUBLIC INFORMATION DIVISION, MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TOKYO, JAPAN, EXPLANATORY
STUDY OF DRAFT JAPANESE PEACE TREATY (1951). See also Japanese Treaty, supra note 22. According to
another U.S. memorandum, the master paper on "Disposition of the Outlying and Minor Japanese Islands"
was never prepared in final form. State Department Papers on the Disposition of Japanese Outlying
Possessions, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
283 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, Revised May 3, 1951, supra note 27.
284 President Harry S. Truman, Japanese Acceptance of Potsdam Declaration, supra note 157.
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1. Drafts Dated March 19, 1947, August 5, 1947, January 8, 1948,
October 13, 1949, and November 2, 1949
The first available draft of the territorial clause on the Liancourt
Rocks dated March 19, 1947, 21 provided: "Japan hereby renounces all
rights and titles to Korea and all minor offshore Korean islands, including
Quelpart Island, Port Hamilton, Dagelet (Utsuryo) Island and Liancourt
Rock (Takeshima). ' 86 This inclusion of the Liancourt Rocks as Korean
territory continued throughout the drafts of August 5, 1947,287 January 8,
1948,288 October 13, 1949,289 and November 2, 1949.29°
There were very slight differences among these drafts, but the main
contents were identical. The territorial clause on the Liancourt Rocks in the
draft dated August 5, 1947, provided: "Japan hereby renounces all rights
and titles to Korea (Chosen) and all offshore Korean islands, including
Quelpart (Saishu To); the Nan How group (San To, or Komun Do) which
forms Port Hamilton (Tonaikai); Dagelet Island (Utsuryo To, or Matsu
Shima); Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima).... ,,291 In the draft dated January 8,
1948, it provided "Japan hereby renounces in favor of the Korean people all
rights and titles to Korea (Chosen) and all offshore Korean islands, including
Quelpart (Saishu To); the Nan How group (San To, or Komun Do) which
forms Port Hamilton (Tonaikai); Dagelet Island (Utsuryo To, or Matsu
Shima); Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima).' 292 In the draft dated October 13,
1949, it stated "Japan hereby renounces in favor of Korea all rights and titles
to the Korean peninsula and offshore Korean islands, including Quelpart
(Saishu To), the Nan How group (San To, or Komun Do) which forms Port
Hamilton (Tonaikai), Dagelet Island (Utsuryo To, or Matsu Shima),
Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima) .. ,,293 Finally, in the draft dated November
2, 1949, the territorial clause provided "Japan hereby renounces in favor of
285 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum to General MacArthur, Outline and Various Sections of
Draft Treaty, supra note 13.
286 Memorandum to General MacArthur, Outline and Various Sections of Draft Treaty, supra note
13, art. 4.
287 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum from Hugh Borton, supra note 14.
288 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum, Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra
note 15.
289 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum, Attached Treaty Draft, supra note 16.
290 This draft is excerpted in Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 17.
291 Memorandum from Hugh Borton, supra note 14, art. 4.
292 Memorandum, Background of Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 15, art. 4.
293 Memorandum, Attached Treaty Draft, supra note 16, art. 4.
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Korea all rights and titles to the Korean mainland territory and all offshore
Korean islands, including Quelpart (Saishu To), the Nan How group (San
To, or Komun Do) which forms Port Hamilton (Tonaikai), Dagelet Island
(Utsuryo To, or Matsu Shima), Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima)."
294
Concerning the above provisions, William J. Sebald, the U.S. Political
Advisor for Japan, recommended a reconsideration of the Liancourt Rocks:
[I]t is suggested that Liancourt Rocks . . . be specified in our
proposed Article 3 as belonging to Japan. Japan's claim to
these islands is old and appears valid, and it is difficult to
regard them as islands off the shore of Korea. Security
considerations might also conceivably render the provision of
weather and radar stations on these islands a matter of interest
to the United States.295
Though the effect of this memorandum on the territorial disposition of
the Liancourt Rocks was not obviously addressed in other diplomatic
documents, the position of the drafters of the San Francisco Peace Treaty
favored Japan in the subsequent drafts.
Other memoranda emphasize that territorial dispositions should favor
Japan. First, Professor Reischauer of Harvard stressed the psychological
296
approach to the Japanese. Second, William Sebald suggested that the idea
of drawing straight lines should be eliminated, for the reason that a
figurative fencing of Japan was psychologically undesirable. 29 7 He further
suggested that it was unnecessary since, from the earlier draft, post-treaty
Japan was supposed to be circumscribed by a continuous line described in
the territorial clause of the treaty and drawn on the map accompanying that
treaty. 298 Third, to spare Japan the trouble of having to cede or renounce by
name a long list of former territories and territorial claims, Mr. Sebald also
suggested that the territorial chapter should be reduced merely to two simple
294 Commentary on Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 17, art. 6(1).
295 Comment on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 7.
296 Notes on Discussion of Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, State Dep't Decimal File No. 740.0011
PW (PEACE)/10-2149, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 21, 1949) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
297 See Memorandum from Mr. Boggs, Special Advisor on Geography, Office of Intelligence
Research, to Mr. Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs, State Dep't
Decimal File No. 740.0011 PW (PEACE)/7-2447, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July 24, 1947)
(on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
298 Commentary on Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 62.
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articles; one would list the territories to be retained by Japan, while in the
other Japan would renounce all other former territories and territorial claims,
which would not be mentioned by name, to the Allied Powers for disposition
under a separate agreement concluded among themselves. 299 Fourth, the
U.S. drafters considered the idea of a separate document for the reason that
in the case of cessions of Japanese territory, th*e absence of "cession to"
clauses in the treaty would be of psychological benefit to Japan.3 ° °
There was a difference of opinion among the drafters at the U.S.
Department of State and the Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party
as to how the territorial clause would be formulated. While the former
opined, "Provision for the disposition of Formosa, the Pescadores, Southern
Sakhalin, the Kuriles, the Central and Southern Ryukyus, the Bonin and
Volcano Islands . . . should be made in the treaty itself. Tsushima,
Takeshima . . . and thousands of other islands in the Inland Sea and
elsewhere close to Japan which have long belonged to Japan would be
assumed to remain Japanese without mention in the treaty, ' 30 1 the latter
generally agreed that "Japan might merely renounce all claims to the ceded
territories in the treaty, disposition of the territories being made in a separate
agreement or agreements.
'
"
30 2
2. Draft Dated December 8, 1949
The territorial clause on the Liancourt Rocks in the draft dated on
December 8, 1949, 303 provided:
The territory of Japan shall comprise the four principal
Japanese home islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and
299 Id. This proposal was rejected after careful consideration because it was feared that, as was
probable, the U.S.S.R. and China would not sign the treaty or separate agreement, and present an unfeasible
outcome for the final disposition of Formosa. Id.
30 Memorandum from Mr. Jack B. Tate, Legal Advisor, to Mr. Maxwell M. Hamilton, U.S.
Representative on the Far Eastern Commission, Territorial Clauses of Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Dec. 19, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD). The Legal Advisor responded: "While the assessment of such a
rationale is not the function of this Office, it would appear to be difficult to appreciate since the territory
will in any event be lost-in two documents instead of one." Id.
301 Memorandum of Conversation, British Commonwealth Conference on Japanese Treaty, supra
note 166.
302 Id.
3" This draft is excerpted in Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses, supra note 18.
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Hokkaido and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands
of the Inland Sea (Seto Naikai); Tsushima, Takeshima
(Liancourt Rocks), Oki Retto, Sado, Okujiri, Rebun, Riishiri
and all other islands in the Japan Sea (Nippon Kai) within a line
connecting the farther shores of Tsushima, Takeshima and
Rebun.3 °4
From this draft, it is apparent that the drafters of the San Francisco
Peace Treaty began to recognize Japanese ownership of the Liancourt
Rocks. Also, it should be noted that there was a U.S. memorandum
providing: "The basic concept of the San Francisco Peace Treaty is that the
treaty should be as brief and general as possible." 305  This seems to be
reflected in the subsequent drafts.
3. Draft Dated December 19, 1949
The draft dated December 19, 1949306 was drafted as the "Agreement
respecting the Disposition of Former Japanese Territories on December 19,
1949." The territorial clause on the Liancourt Rocks in this draft provided:
The Allied and Associated Powers agree that there shall be
transferred in full sovereignty to the Republic of Korea all
rights and titles to the Korean mainland territory and all
offshore Korean islands, including Quelpart (Saishu To), the
Nan How group (San To, or Komun Do) which forms Port
Hamilton (Tonaikai), Degelet Island (Utsuryo To, or Matsu
Shima), Liancourt Rocks (Takeshima). °7
Thus, the ownership of the Liancourt Rocks was given to Korea.
304 Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, Territorial Clauses, supra note 18, art. 3.
305 Memorandum from Maxwell M. Hamilton, U.S. Representative on the Far Eastern Commission,
in DOS/FE, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Nov. 7, 1949) (on file with the U.S. National Archives
and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
306 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum, supra note 25.
307 Memorandum, supra note 25, art. 3.
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4. Drafts Dated December 29, 1949, and January 3, 1950
The territorial clause on the Liancourt Rocks in the drafts dated
December 29, 1949,308 and January 3, 1950, 309 provided:
The territory of Japan shall comprise the four principal
Japanese islands of Honshu, Kyushu, Shikoku and Hokkaido
and all adjacent minor islands, including the islands of the
Inland Sea (Seto Naikai); Tsushima, Takeshima (Liancourt
Rocks), Oki Retto, Sado, Okujiri, Rebun, Riishiri and all other
islands in the Japan Sea (Nippon Kai) within a line connecting
the farther shores of Tsushima, Takeshima and Rebun.
310
Japan hereby renounces in favor of Korea all rights and titles to
the Korean mainland territory and all offshore Korean islands,
including Quelpart (Saishu To), the Nan How group (San To, or
Komun Do) which forms Port Hamilton (Tonaikai), Dagelet
Island (Utsuryo To, or Matsu Shima), and all other offshore
Korean islands and islets to which Japan had acquired title.
311
Like the draft dated December 8, 1949, the drafts dated December 29,
1949, and January 3, 1950, recognized Japanese ownership of the Liancourt
Rocks. In conjunction with the above-mentioned memorandum by Mr.
Sebald, this stance was reflected in the "Commentary on Draft Treaty of
Peace with Japan," which provided:
Takeshima (Liancourt Rocks) . . . were formally claimed by
Japan in 1905, apparently without protest by Korea, and placed
under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of
Shimane Prefecture. [R]ecords show that for a long time
Japanese fisherman migrated there during certain seasons.
Unlike Dagelet Island a short distance to the west, Takeshima
308 This draft is excerpted in Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 26.
309 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra note 26.
310 Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra note 26, art. 3(1); Draft
Japanese Peace Treaty, Revised May 3, 1951, supra note 27, art. 3(1).
311 Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra note 26, art. 6; Draft
Japanese Peace Treaty, Revised May 3, 1951, supra note 27, art. 6.
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has no Korean name and does not appear ever to have been
claimed by Korea. The islands have been used by U.S. forces
during the occupation as a bombing range and have possible
value as a weather or radar station site.312
In the meantime, the drafters changed the pattern of designating either
Korea or Japan as the recipient of the Liancourt Rocks, and the subsequent
drafts made no reference to the Liancourt Rocks. This has led to self-
serving interpretations by the claimants. The adoption of this pattern was
the reflection of compromise, as shown below, between the Commonwealth
Japanese Treaty Working Party and the U.S. Department of State's new
stance, including Mr. Dulles' proposed shortened version of the draft.
Among the list of general areas of agreement reached by the
Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party in London is an item titled
"Territories to be taken from Japan need not be mentioned in a Peace
Treaty., 313  On other territorial issues, it was generally agreed by the
Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party that: first, Japanese
sovereignty would be confined to the four main islands and to a number of
adjacent minor islands whose precise definition would be a matter for the
Peace Conference; and second, the disposition of the territories to be ceded
by Japan need not be dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty itself.
Japan might merely renounce all claims to the ceded territories.314
5. Drafts Dated August 7, 1950, and September 11, 1950
The territorial clause on Korea in the draft dated August 7, 1950,315
provided: "Japan recognizes the independence of Korea and will base its
relation with Korea on the resolutions adopted by the United Nations
311 Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra note 26.
313 Memorandum from John M. Allison, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, State Dep't Records,
Record Group 59 (May 25, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in
College Park, MD); Memorandum from Maxwell M. Hamilton, U.S. Representative on the Far Eastern
Commission, Territorial Provisions in Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (May
26, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
314 British Embassy in Washington, DC, USA, to Commonwealth Working Party on Japanese Peace
Treaty, Report of the Commonwealth Working Party, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/9-2050 CS/H,
State Dcp't Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 20, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
315 This draft is excerpted in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 28.
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Assembly on December, 1948."36 There is a memorandum in regard to
Article 4 of the clause on Korea, which suggests modification of the last
clause, as to state: "[Japan] will base its relations with Korea on the actions
taken by the United Nations with respect to Korea." This took account of
Security Council and General Assembly resolutions subsequent to December
1948. 317 Accordingly, the draft dated September 11, 1950, 31' further
provided that "Japan recognizes the independence of Korea and will base its
relation with Korea on the resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly and Security Council with respect to Korea.' '31 9 The draft dated
September 11, 1950, was created to serve as a basis for further consideration
and informal discussion with other members of the Allied Powers, though its
text was purely tentative. 320 In conjunction with suggestions agreed to by
the Commonwealth Japanese Treaty Working Party, this short version of the
territorial disposition over Korea served as the basic framework throughout
the remaining subsequent drafts, with some changes in style. As a result, the
drafters' intention over the territorial disposition of the Liancourt Rocks
became unclear.
As evidenced by the memoranda and notes within the U.S.
Department of State, the drafters weighed the gains and the losses of
adopting a short version versus a long one. Those in favor of a long version
expressed concerns about possible loss in precision and comprehensiveness
of the treaty, saying that "the omission of a given Article or paragraph or the
substitution of single sentence for an Article or Annex will leave uncovered
matters which in consequence will become the source of confusion and
disputes., 32t This group further raised some substantive issues, such as the
316 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 28, ch. IV.
317 Memorandum from Adrian S. Fisher, Legal Advisor, to John F. Dulles, Special Assistant to the
Secretary of State, Short Form of Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 16,
1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD)
[hereinafter Short Form of Japanese Peace Treaty].
3's This draft is excerpted in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 29.
319 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 29, ch. IV.
3'0 Memorandum from John F. Dulles, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, Office of the
Secretary, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/9-1150 CS/H, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59
(Sept. 11, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park,
MD). It appears that other drafts were made between August 7, 1950, and September 11, 1950, as this
memorandum also indicated that "It reflects certain of the points of view put forward by the . ..
Department since the circulation of the prior draft of August 18, 1950." Id.
321 Memorandum from Mr. Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Division of Northeast Asian
Affairs, to Mr. Allison, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, Japanese Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File
No. 694.001/8-950 CS/W, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 9, 1950) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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following question: "Are the territorial dimensions of the new Japan
sufficiently clear, for example, offshore islands like Sado and islands to
which title may be disputed such as Tsushima and Takeshima? '3 22 It further
pointed out that the only advantage of a very short treaty was that it could be
more quickly negotiated if the other Allied Powers were willing to go along
with such a treaty or, if they were not, the United States was willing to
proceed without them.
323
In general, it was agreed that a long draft created less danger of future
disputes. 324 Mr. Adrian S. Fisher, the Legal Advisor of the U.S. Department
of State, also opined, "In light of the inter-Allied agreements on Japan made
from 1943 to 1945, I believe the Japanese Peace Treaty ought not only to
contain a definite statement of what territory shall henceforth be Japan but
also clear provisions as to how all detached territories shall be disposed
of.,325 In the same vein, as to the chapter on territorial settlements, it was
suggested that a reference be made to an annex to the treaty in which precise
descriptions of the territories of Japan, Korea, Formosa and the Pescadores,
and Sakhalin, could be set forth, and that the annex might appropriately
contain the provisions set forth in the longer form of the draft treaty.
Eventually, the drafters preferred to adopt the short version due to the
advantage of making negotiations with other Allied Powers a great deal
quicker.327 It is also interesting to note that very few officers of the U.S.
Department of State participated in the drafting work. Thus, a memorandum
by a Department of State official stated: "[t]o my knowledge, the Draft
Treaty has not been widely circulated in the Department. In fact, I do not
know what progress has been made on the project. 328
In the meantime, in response to the Australian Government's request
for clarification of certain questions arising out of the position of the United
322 Id.
323 Id.
324 Memorandum from Mr. Hamilton, U.S. Representative on the Far Eastern Commission, Short
Version of Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 10, 1950) (on file with the
U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Short Version of
Japanese Peace Treaty].
325 Short Form of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 317.
326 id.
327 Short Version of Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 324.
328 Memorandum from Paul T. Meyer, Assistant Secretary of State, Japanese Peace Treaty, State
Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/9-150 CS/B, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Sept. 9, 1951) (on
file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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States, 329 concerning the disposition of former Japanese territories in
particular, the United States answered: "It is thought that the islands of the
Inland Sea... [Liancourt Rocks], all long recognized as Japanese, would be
retained by Japan.,
330
6. Drafts Dated March 12, 1951, and March 17, 1951
The territorial clause on Korea in the drafts dated March 12, 1951,"3'
and March 17, 195 1,332 provided that "Japan renounces all rights, titles and
claims to Korea. 3 33  These drafts are the shortest versions of the San
Francisco Peace Treaty with respect to territorial dispositions over Korea. It
is also unclear from these drafts how the drafters viewed the territorial
disposition of the Liancourt Rocks.
7. Draft Dated April 7, 1951
The territorial clause on Korea in the draft dated April 7, 1951334
provided:
Japanese sovereignty shall continue over all the islands and
adjacent islets and rocks lying within an area bounded by a line
from latitude 30' N. in a north-westerly direction to . . . the
south-east and Take Shima to the north-west curving with the
coast of Honshu.
335
Japan hereby renounces any claim to sovereignty over, and all
right, title and interest in Korea, and undertakes to recognize
329 Letter from D.W. McNicol, Second Secretary of the Australian Embassy to the U.S., to John M.
Allison, United States Delegation to the United Nations, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/10-1950
CS/H, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 19, 1950) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
330 Answers to Questions submitted by the Australian Government arising out of the Statement of
Principles regarding a Japanese Treaty prepared by the United States Government, State Dep't Decimal
File No. 694.001/10-2650, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Oct. 26, 1950) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
33' This draft is excerpted in Memorandum from John F. Dulles, supra note 24.
332 This draft is excerpted in Memorandum, supra note 25.
333 Memorandum from John F. Dulles, supra note 24, ch. III; Memorandum, supra note 25, ch. 111.
33' This draft is excerpted in Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra
note 26.
335 Provisional Draft of Japanese Peace Treaty (United Kingdom), supra note 26, pt. I, art. I
JANUARY 2002
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
and respect all such arrangements as may be made by or under
the auspices of the United Nations regarding the sovereignty
and independence of Korea. 336
Like the drafts dated December 8, 1949, December 29, 1949, and
January 3, 1950, the draft dated April 7, 1951, recognized Japanese
ownership of the Liancourt Rocks.
Meanwhile, the United Kingdom proposed that the islands between
Korea and Japan should be disposed of by specific reference. For example,
"including Quelpart" could be inserted after "Korea" in the territorial
clause,337 as was reflected in subsequent drafts.
8. Draft Dated May 3, 1951
The territorial clause on Korea in the draft dated May 3, 1951338
provided:
Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including
Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet, and agree to recognize
and respect all arrangements which may be made by or under
the auspices of the United Nations regarding the sovereignty
and independence of Korea.339
Again, the reference to the Liancourt Rocks disappeared. Thus, it
became unclear how the drafters viewed the territorial disposition of the
Liancourt Rocks. This lack of clarity is also evidenced in the draft dated
May 3, 1951, in which the provisions on the territorial dispositions with
respect to Japan also disappeared.
In the meantime, New Zealand asserted: "In view of the need to
ensure that none of the islands near Japan is left in disputed sovereignty, the
New Zealand Government favors the precise delimitation by latitude and
longitude of the territory to be retained by Japan as suggested in Article 1 of
the United Kingdom's draft. The adoption of this device could ... make it
336 Id. pt. I, art. 2.
331 Check List of Positions Stated by the U.S. and the UK, supra note 268338 This draft is excerpted in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, Revised May 3, 1951, supra note 27.
339 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, Revised May 3, 1951, supra note 27, ch. II, art. 2(a).
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clear." 340 With respect to this suggestion, the United States responded in the
following negative terms:
In the discussions at Washington the British agreed to drop this
proposal when the United States pointed to the psychological
disadvantages of seeming to fence Japan in by a continuous line
around Japan. The Japanese had objected to the British
proposal when it was discussed with them in Tokyo. U.S.
willingness to specify in the treaty that Korean territory
included Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet also helped to
persuade the British.34'
France also raised the question of whether it would be desirable to
include a reference to the resolution of the territorial problems by the United
Nations. In response, the United States stated that, since exchanges of views
already had indicated strong opposition to this solution, it seemed better to
limit the treaty to liquidating the Japanese interests and to avoid the question
of how to deal with the future.342 As subsequent drafts demonstrate, the
United States also maintained that it was dangerous to impose upon the
United Nations, by treaty, a responsibility so heavy that it might even disrupt
the United Nations itself3 43 .
9. Drafts Dated June 14, 1951, July 3, 1951, and July 20, 1951
The territorial clause on Korea in the drafts dated June 14, 195 1,
344
July 3, 1951,345 and July 20, 1951346 provided: "Japan, recognizing the
independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to Korea,
including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet."
347
As to these drafts, in particular regarding the draft dated July 3, 1951,
there appeared amendments proposed by Korea for the territorial disposition
340 Japanese Peace Treaty, Working Draft and Commentary, supra note 262.
341 id.
342 Conversations of John Foster Dulles, supra note 268.
343 Id.
3" This draft is excerpted in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 28.
345 This draft is excerpted in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 29.
346 This draft is excerpted in Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30.
347 Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 28, ch. II, art. 2(a); Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra
note 29, ch. II, art. 2(a); Draft Treaty of Peace with Japan, supra note 30, ch. II, art. 2(a).
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over Korea, including the Liancourt Rocks. Korea proposed the following
revisions in the draft dated July 3, 1951:
Revision of Article 2(a) to provide that Japan "confirms that it
renounced on August 9, 1945, all right, title and claim to Korea
and the islands which were part of Korea prior to its annexation
by Japan, including the islands Quelpart, Port Hamilton,
Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo. 348
As to Dokdo or Tokdo, which is the Korean name for the Liancourt
Rocks, Mr. Boggs, a geographer in the Department of State, reported that
Japan formally claimed it in 1905, apparently without protest by Korea,
which appeared never to have claimed it before, though this report was
subject to further research. 349 This memorandum, however, recognized that
the issue of the Liancourt Rocks was one of several remaining problems, and
further proposed that "Japan, recognizing the independence of Korea,
renounces all right, title and claim to Korea, including Quelpart, Port
Hamilton and Dagelet," 350 as Article 2(a) provided.
Nevertheless, as other U.S. memoranda on the Liancourt Rocks
indicated, the final disposition over the Liancourt Rocks was not completely
decided by the U.S. drafters. There were a few U.S. memoranda which
favored Korean ownership over the Liancourt Rocks. As one memorandum
provided, "If it is decided to give them to Korea, it would be necessary only
to add "and Liancourt Rocks" at the end of Article 2, par. (a). 351 Another
memorandum further clarified this issue as follows:
The Liancourt Rocks ... were among the islands to which, in a
1949 draft treaty, Japan would have renounced claim to Korea.
In a Japanese Foreign Office publication, entitled "Minor
348 Memorandum from Allison, U.S. Delegation to the United Nations, to Dulles, Consultant to the
Secretary of State, Unresolved Treaty Provisions, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/5-2951 CS/JEC,
State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (May 29, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
349 id.
350 Id.
351 Memorandum, Spratly Island and the Paracels in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty (July 16, 1951)
State Dep't Decimal File No. FW 694.001/7-1351 CS/CVE, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July
16, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, 352 Part IV, June 1947,
Liancourt Rocks are included. It may therefore be advisable to
name them specifically in the draft treaty, in some such form as
the following (Article 2): (a) Japan, recognizing the
independence of Korea, renounces all right, title and claim to
Korea, including the islands of Quelpart, Port Hamilton,
Dagelet, and Liancourt Rocks.
35 3
Korea's position was reiterated by its Foreign Minister, who proposed
that the final phrase in Article 2(a) should be amended after "claim to
Korea" to read, "and all islands which were part of Korea prior to its
annexation by Jasan, including [Quelpart], Port Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo
and [Parangdo]." '  Further, Korea requested that the word "renounces" in
Article 2(a) should be replaced by "confirms that it renounced on August 9,
1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of
Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including the islands Quelpart, Port
Hamilton, Dagelet, Dokdo and Parangdo." 35
As to the first proposal, providing inclusion of the Liancourt Rocks in
Article 2(a), Mr. Dulles responded that if the Liancourt Rocks had been
Korean territory before the Japanese annexation, there was no particular
problem in including these islands in the pertinent part of the treaty that
related to the renunciation of Japanese territorial claims to Korean
territory.356 However, no relevant, reliable resources were identified,357 even
352 Shortly after the draft dated March 19, 1947 was made, the Foreign Office of the Japanese
Government published "Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper" for information of the Allied Power in
June 1947. This document contained the basic position of the Japanese Government, which maintained
historical title to Liancourt Rocks. See Foreign Office, Japanese Government, Minor Islands Adjacent to
Japan Proper, Part IV, Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in the Japan Sea, For Information of the
Allied Authorities, State Dep't Decimal File No. 894.014/9-2347, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59
(June 1947) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
353 Memorandum, Spratly Island and the Parcels in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 351.
314 Incoming Telegram to Secretary of State, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/7-1751 HH, State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July 17, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
355 Letter from You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador in Washington, D.C., to Dean G. Acheson, U.S.
Secretary of State, State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July 19, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD) [hereinafter Letter from You Chan Yang]; see
also Memorandum of Conversation, Japanese Peace Treaty, State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/7-1951,
State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July 19, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and
Records Administration in College Park, MD).
356 Memorandum of Conversation, Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 355.
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considering resources of the Korean Embassy in the United States. 358 The
United States was inclined not to consider this proposal to confirm Korean
sovereignty over the Liancourt Rocks.359
With respect to the second request of Korea, that Article 2(a) of the
draft be revised to provide that Japan "confirms that it renounced on August
9, 1945, all right, title and claim to Korea and the islands which were part of
Korea prior to its annexation by Japan, including . . . Dokdo," the United
States did not concur because of the following facts: first, according to U.S.
information, the Liancourt Rocks were never treated as part of Korea and,
since about 1905, had been under the jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch
Office of Shimane Prefecture of Japan; second, the United States doubted
that the formula confirming Japan's renunciation of certain territorial claims
to Korea could be included in the treaty as suggested by Korea; 360 third, the
United States recognized that the terms of the Japanese surrender instrument
of August 9, 1945, did not themselves technically constitute a formal and
final determination of this question;36 and fourth, the United States could
not accept the argument that Japan's acceptance of the Potsdam
Proclamation was a formal or final renunciation of Japan's sovereignty over
the areas dealt with in the Proclamation.
362
10. The Implications of Drafts on the Territorial Dispositions over the
Liancourt Rocks in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
When Japan agreed in Article 2 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty to
renounce "all right, title and claim to Korea, including the islands Quelpart,
Port Hamilton, and Dagelet," the Liancourt Rocks were not included within
the area to be renounced. Japan has, and with reason, assumed that its
357 Memorandum to Mr. Robert A. Fearey, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Division of Northeast
Asian Affairs, from Mr. S.W. Boggs, Special Advisor on Geography, Office of Intelligence Research,
Parangdo and Dokdo (islands), State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (July 31, 1951) (on file with the U.S.
National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
358 Outgoing Telegram from Dean Acheson, Secretary of State, to U.S. Embassy in Korea, State
Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 7, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration in College Park, MD).
359 Id.
360 Letter from Dean Rusk, Assistant Secretary of State, to You Chan Yang, Korean Ambassador in
Washington, D.C., State Dep't Decimal File No. 694.001/8-1051 CS/H, State Dep't Records, Record
Group 59 (Aug. 9, 1951) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration in College
Park, MD) [hereinafter Letter from Dean Rusk).
361 Letter from You Chan Yang, supra note 355.
362 Letter from Dean Rusk, supra note 360.
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sovereignty still extends over the Liancourt Rocks, and the Koreans have
disputed this assumption.363 Therefore, as Charney points out, "There is
even a dispute over whether by implication or, by general terms, the victors
in World War II intended to return the disputed [Liancourt Rocks] to
Korea. , 36
During the course of drafting the San Francisco Peace Treaty, Korea's
views were solicited, in consequence of which the Korean Ambassador
requested the U.S. Secretary of State in a letter of July 19, 1951 to amend
Article 2(a) of the draft treaty so as to include the Liancourt Rocks as well as
Quelpart, Port Hamilton and Dagelet among those islands over which Japan
would renounce right, title and claim by virtue of recognizing Korea's
independence. In his reply to the Korean Ambassador, Mr. Dean Rusk, the
Assistant Secretary of State, stated in a letter dated August 10, 1951 that the
United States could not concur in the proposed amendment as it applied to
the Liancourt Rocks, since according to his information the Liancourt Rocks
had never been treated as a part of Korea-they had been under the
jurisdiction of the Oki Islands Branch Office of Japan's Shimane Prefecture
since 1905 and it did not appear that they had ever before been claimed by
Korea. As a result, Article 2(a) of the San Francisco Peace Treaty made no
mention of the Liancourt Rocks.365
Accordingly, it appeas that the United States viewed the San
Francisco Peace Treaty as constituting a determination that the "minor
islands" would be left to Japan under the Potsdam Proclamation, and that the
treaty left the Liancourt Rocks to Japan. The United States' stated position
was simply that of one of the several signatories of the treaty, and that
Article 22 of the San Francisco Peace Treaty, providing for reference to the
International Court of Justice, was drafted in order to settle disputes arising
from the treaty.366
In determining what course of action should be taken in light of this
development, a question arose about whether the statement made in Mr.
Rusk's letter entailed the legal conclusion that the San Francisco Peace
Treaty left the Liancourt Rocks to Japan. On the one hand, it may be argued
363 Letter from Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., supra note 188.
364 Charney, supra note 3, at 161.
365 Letter from Mr. Kenneth T. Young, Jr., supra note 188; see San Francisco Peace Treaty, San
Francisco Peace Treaty, supra note 12, art. 2(a), 3 U.S.T. 3172,136 U.N.T.S. 49.
366 Conflicting Korean-Japanese Claims to Dokdo Island (Otherwise Known as Takeshima or
Liancourt Rocks), State Dep't Records, Record Group 59 (Aug. 26, 1954) (on file with the U.S. National
Archives and Records Administration in College Park, MD).
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that the determination of the minor islands to be left under Japanese
sovereignty required by the Potsdam Proclamation has been made by the
treaty; i.e., Japan retained everything not renounced under Article 2; that
Korea, prior to the signing of the treaty, specifically asked for a renunciation
of the Liancourt Rocks by Japan and was turned down; that, therefore, it was
the intent of the drafters of the treaty that Japan not renounce the Liancourt
Rocks; and that these islands were accordingly included in the minor islands
determined to remain under Japanese sovereignty.
On the other hand, it may be argued that Mr. Rusk's letter refusing to
include the Liancourt Rocks in the islands renounced in connection with
Korea was based on the U.S. understanding of the historical facts, providing
that "Dokdo . . . was according to our information never treated as part of
Korea," and that his statement left the door open for Korea to show that it
had in fact treated the Liancourt Rocks as part of Korea prior to 1905, when
the Japanese placed the Liancourt Rocks under the jurisdiction of Shimane
Prefecture. Under this theory, Korea would still be free to establish legally,
if it could, that the "Korea" renounced in the San Francisco Peace Treaty
included the Liancourt Rocks.367 This rationale is supported by the fact that
the reports on the Liancourt Rocks were based for the most part on Japanese
language sources available in the Department of State and the Library of
Congress, studies prepared by the Department of State, and studies by the
Japanese Foreign Office.368
IV. CONCLUSION
Although careful drafting of the San Francisco Peace Treaty could
have put an end to territorial disputes over islands,369 today, almost half a
century later, territorial disputes remain. This is not surprising given that
historical facts were not a major factor in the post-World War II territorial
dispositions in East Asia. Territorial provisions of the San Francisco Peace
Treaty largely reflected the Allied Powers' policy in East Asia, which failed
to give serious consideration to rival claims to title over specific territories.
The fact that the Allied Powers were more concerned with their own geo-
367 id.
368 See, e.g., Memorandum, Spratly Island and the Paracels in Draft Japanese Peace Treaty, supra
note 351; Minor Islands Adjacent to Japan Proper, Part IV, Minor Islands in the Pacific, Minor Islands in
the Jaran Sea, For Information of the Allied Authorities, supra note 352.
See Memorandum of Conversation, Canberra Conference on Japanese Peace Treaty, supra note 2.
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political and strategic interests resulted in a failure to resolve territorial
disputes in East Asia.
It is one thing to determine the abstract legal question of sovereignty
over the disputed islands in East Asia, but it is quite another to effectuate it
in practice. Given the institutional void in the East Asian region insofar as
the resolution of territorial disputes is concerned, and given the current
political atmosphere in the region, one is skeptical about the likelihood of a
regional dispute resolution any time soon.37 °
Nevertheless, it is imperative that the disputants approach the issues
through dialogue and with a spirit of compromise. An all-or-nothing
approach, which obviously does not accommodate the mutual interests of the
disputants, will only aggravate an already precarious situation. Therefore,
various confidence-building measures, including joint development of the
disputed maritime zone for the mutual benefit of all the affected parties,
should be attempted first, prior to any hasty attempt to resolve the question
of sovereignty over the disputed territories. Finally, every effort should be
made to determine the real worth of the disputed territories instead of
placing undue reliance, as is presently the case, on exaggerated notions of
what is at stake.
All the claimants (China, Japan, Korea, Russia, and Taiwan) in the
disputes over the Kurile Islands, Senkaku Islands, and Liancourt Rocks,
have certain international legal obligations in accordance with the U.N.
Charter principle of peaceful settlement of disputes, especially as articulated
in Articles 2 and 33(1). 371 The duty to conduct good faith negotiations in
certain circumstances also finds substantial support in the recent decision by
the International Court of Justice in the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project,
emphasizing that good faith negotiations should be conducted under
international law.
372
Finally, the mode of resolution and the legal arguments regarding
these controversies in East Asia shed light on several ongoing disputes in
other regions in Asia including, inter alia, the Spratly Islands and Paracel
370 See M. K. Young, Regional Institutions in East Asia and The Pacific: Is the Time Ripe?, 89 AM.
SOC'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 471 (1995); G. Triggs, Confucius and Consensus: International Law in the
Asian Pacific, 21 MELB. U. L. REv. 650 (1997).
371 See U.N. CHARTER arts. 2, 33 para. 1, available at http://www.deoxy.org/wc/wc-un.htm (last
visited Nov. 17, 2001).
372 Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovk.), 1997 I.C.J. 7, 78-79 (Sept. 25) (quoting its
Judgment in the 1969 North Sea Continental Shelf cases).
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Islands.373 Therefore, the eventual resolution of these disputes implicates the
regional dynamics of territorial dispute settlements among several Asian
nations.
373 For brief information on this issue, see generally BORDER AND TERRITORIAL DISPUTES, supra note
3, at 469-71, 542-45; G. AUSTIN, CHINA'S OCEAN FRONTIER: INTERNATIONAL LAW, MILITARY FORCE AND
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 98-161 (1998); M. CHEMILLIER-GENDREAU, SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE PARACEL
AND SPRATLY ISLANDS (2000); C.C. Joyner, The Spratly Islands Dispute: What Role for Normalizing
Relations Between China and Taiwan, 32 NEW ENG. L. REV. 819 (1998); C. Liu, Chinese Sovereignty and
Joint Development: A Pragmatic Solution to the Spratly Islands Dispute, 18 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 865 (1996); L. A. Mito, The Timor Gap Treaty as a Model for Joint Development in the
Spratly Islands, 13 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 727 (1998); S. SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 282-90 (1997); J. Shen, International Law Rules and Historical Evidences
Supporting China's Title to the South China Sea Islands, 21 HASTINGS INT'L & COMp. L.J. 1 (1997).
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